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RECENT DECISIONS
AGENcY-FACTORS' ACT-EFFECT

or

NOTICE TO PERSON DEALING WITH FACTOR.-

Plaintiff financed the purchase of an automobile by a retail dealer paying for the
automobile and taking a bill of sale therefor from the defendant-seller. Defendant
knew that plaintiff was the owner of the automobile and that the retail dealer had
possession of it "under some agency agreement". Later defendant induced the retail
dealer to exchange the automobile for another of a different model but of the same
value. On appeal from a judgment finding defendant liable for conversion of the
automobile, held. the retail dealer was a "factor or other agent" within the Factors'
Act, and the exchange ofi the automobile was a bona fide contract of sale notwithstanding defendant's knowledge of plaintiff's ownership of the automobile and of
the dealer's possession of it "under some agency agreement". Hence defendant-seller
was not a converter. Exceptions sustained and judgment for defendant. Associates
Discount Corp. v. C. E. Fay Co., 30 N. E. (2d) 876 (Mass. 1941).1
The courts of various jurisdictions where Factors' Acts 2 are in force differ in theii
interpretation of the scope and operation of such statutes.3 This difference becomes
important in a case like the principal case, where the factor has authority as ageift
to conclude one type of transaction, e.g., a sale, but actually concludes another type
in excess of authority, here an exchange. The difference is principally as to the effect
of notice to a purchaser or pledgee from a factor, that the person with whom he
is dealing is an agent. In some jurisdictions the right of the purchaser to the protection of the Factors' Act is denied only if it is'proved that he knew of the agent's
4
bad faith and lack of authority to enter into the particular transaction in question.
In New York, however, mere notice that the agent holds .the goods as agent, has
1. In reaching its decision the court declared that though the transaction between plaintiff and the retail dealer was of the nature of a trust receipt agreement, no written truist
receipt having been executed expressive of that agreement, the case did not fall vithin
the purview 'of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, and is to be decided according to preexisting law. 9 UioPaa LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1940) 296-318. See Bacon, The Uniform
Trust Receipts Act (1936) 5 FoaRnAm L. REv. 240, 246. It also said that authority to sell

in the sense in which that phrase is used in the Factors' Act includes authority fo bartfer
and exchange. This was not true at common law. Kearns v. Nickse, 80 Conn. 23, 66
At]. 779 (1907); Jones v. Richards, 50 Misc. 645, 98 N. Y. Supp. 698 (Sup. Ct. 1906).;
Roberts v. Francis, 123 Wis. 78f 100 N. W. 1076 (1904). See RESTATEasENT, AGENCY
(1933) § 65, sub. 1. In Victor Sewing Machine Co. v. Heller, 44 Wis. 265 (1878), the
court in construing a Facfors' Act almost identical with that in New York and similar
to that in Massachusetts said, "It appears to us that, under any fair construction of this
section. a person who barters with an agent is not protected thereby." Id. at 273. See
1 WmLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 317.
2. The Massachusetts Factors' Act is found in MAss. AmN. LAWS (Supp. 1940) c. 104, § 1.
3. See 1 WILriSTOx, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 320.
4. Price v. Wisconsin M. & F. Ins. 'Co., 43 Wis. 267 (1877), follows the Massachusetts
view that notice that the factor holds goods as a factor is not notice of any limitation
of his authority; therefore knowledge of the mere fact of agency, will not take the purchaser out of the protection of the Act. But if the purchaser is aware of the bad faith
of the factor, or if he is aware that the factor is acting in excess of his authority, ,then
the case does not come within the Act.
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been said to be sufficient to deprive the purchaser of the protection of the Factors'
Act,5 when the factor acts in excess of authority.
In view of this difference a brief history of the Factors' Acts may be in order.
They were first enacted in England. 6 Their purpose was to limit the common law
rule that in general a principal is not bound by an unauthorized disposition of his
property made by his agent. The disposition of the common law was to protect
ownership wherever possible.7 This common law rule was thought to hinder the
expansion of trade. The Factors' Acts were aimed at removing such an obstruction.
Mere notice of the agency, by the purchaser was sufficient to take a case out of the
protection of the statute under the original English Acts. But that was changed by
an amendment in 1842, which gave protection to the purchaser unless he knew that
the agent was acting without authority s to complete the transaction in question.
Whether notice of the fact of agency by the purchaser will require him to look
into its limitations is hardly an open question in New York. The substance of the
New York Factors' Act is in these words: "Every factor or other agent . . . who
shall be entrusted with possession of any merchandise for the purpose of sale . . .
shall be deemed to be the true owner thereof, so far as to give validity to any contract made by such agent with any other person, for the sale or disposition of the
whole or any part of such merchandise . . . for any money advanced . . . upon the
faith thereof." 9 The interpretation of the phrase "upon the faith thereof" was the
subject of some discussion in New York. In Pegram v. Carson'0 it was said that
these words are the only language in the Act that give rise to any idea that knowledge of the factor's employment as a factor is fatal to one seeking the protection
of the Act. In that case it was held that mere knowledge of the agency is not sufficient to call for inquiry by a purchaser into its limitations. The words "upon the
faith thereof" were referred to the possession of the factor and on that basis the
court ruled that the purchaser might rely on the mere possession of the factor, with
the result that notice of the agency without more would not exclude the purchaser
from the protection of the Act. Later New York cases, however, have interpreted
the words "upon the faith thereof" as referring not to possession merely, but to
apparent ownership of the factor." A United States Supreme Court case, Allen v.
St. Louis Bank,12 said: ". . . the construction of this section of the New York statute
5. Sfevens v. Wilson, 6 Hill 512 (N. Y. 1844), aff'd, 3 Denio 472 (N. Y. 1846);
Florence Sewing Machine Co. v. Warford, 31 N. Y. Super. Ct. 433 (1869); Dorrance v.
Dean, 106 N. Y. 203, 12 N. E. 433 (1887).
6. For a review of the English Acts see, 1 WmLzsTox, SAL.Es (2d ed. 1924) §§ 318, 319.
7. There were some exceptions, however, namely: the doctrine of n~arket overt; the
transfer of negotiable paper payable to bearer or transferable by delivery; and the doctrine
of estoppel of owners who had clothed another with the indicia of 6wnership. See WILms'TON, SAES (2d ed. 1924) § 311 et seq.
8.

5 & 6 Vicr., c. 39 (1841); Navulshaw v. Brownrigg, 2 De. G. M. & G. 411, 13 Eng.

L. & Eq. 262 (1852), (held, mere suspicion, alone of want of authority to, pledge, would
not deprive pledgee of the benefits of the Act).
9. N. Y. PEas. PROP. LAw § 43, amended by N. Y. Laws 1915, c. 273.
10. 10 Bos. 505 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1863).
11.

Stevens v. Wilson, 6 Hill 512 (N. Y. 1844), aff'd, 3 Denio 472 (N. Y. 1846);

G. Dewey Sullivan v. Stern, Inc., 148 Misc. 235, 265 N. Y. Supp. 481 (Munic. Ct. 1933);
Canales v. Earl, 168 N. Y. Supp. 726 (Munic. Ct. 1918).
12. 120 U. S. 20 (1886).
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had been settled . . . to be that the words "upon the faith thereof" were not to be
referred to 'merchandise' or to its symbols, but to the words 'shall be deemed to
be the true owner thereof' ,.1 If the words "upon the faith thereof" refer not to
possession merely, but to apparent ownership, then it would follow that if the purchaser had knowledge of the fact of the agency he should be denied the protection
of the Act, for a purchaser with knowledge of the agency cannot make his purchase
in reliance upon apparent ownership. Pegram v. Carson, seemingly stands alone in
New York in its construction of the words "upon the faith thereof". Therefore the
Allen case quite probably may be taken as a correct declaration of the New York law.
The Massachusetts Factors' Act 14 does not contain the words "upon the faith
thereof." That Act declares that the factor "shall be deemed to be the true owner
. . . so far as to give validity to any bona fide contract of sale made by him."
Implicit in the words "bona fide contract" would seem to be the requirement that
the purchaser be without notice of the agency. In Massachusetts now, however,
knowledge of the existence of the agency will not without more preclude the operation of the statute. 15 This view of the Massachusetts courts has an analogy in the
negotiable instruments law where mere suspicious circumstances though sufficient to
put a prudent man on inquiry, will not of themselves necessarily prevent recovery
by the holder of negotiable paper. Yet such circumstances may be taken into consideration by the jury as evidence of the holder's bad faith. 16
The true policy of the law seems to be to apply to commercial transactions the
general rule of common law that where one of two innocent persons must suffer a
loss from the act of a third party, such loss should be placed on the innocent party
who made it possible for the third party to perform the act which caused the loss.
Thus, where the owner of goods has entrusted them to an agent with authority to
sell, it is incumbent upon that owner to select an honest agent; and should the agent
turn out to be dishonest and sell them to an innocent purchaser without authority,
the loss is to be charged to the owner who selected the dishonest agent and not to
the purchaser who is wholly innocent. 17 It is clear that Massachusetts is a little
more liberal in its view of the policy of the law than New York. The courts of
Wisconsin,' 8 Maryland' 0 and England 20 follow the Massachusetts view that notice
13.

Id. at 33.

14.

MAss. ANN. LAWS (Supp. 1940) c. 104, § 1.

15. Associates Discount Corp. v. C. E. Fay Co., 30 N. E. (2d) 876 (Mass. 1941). Cf.
Essex County Acceptance Corp. v. Pierce Arrow Sales Co. of Boston, 288 Mass. 270, 192
N. E. 604 (1933), where it was said that circumstances might be such that a person who
had loaned money and accepted a chattel mortgage on the strength of the factor's possession of an automobile under a trust receipt agreement, would be charged with notice
of his limited authority.
16. See BRAs , NEGOTIBLE INsTRUMENTs (6th ed. 1938) § 56.
17.

Freudenheim v. Gutfer, 201 N. Y. 94, 100, 94 N. E. 640, 642 (1911); Kinston

Cotton Mills v. Kuhne, 129 App. Div. 250, 256, 113 N. Y. Supp. 779, 783 (1st Dep't 1908).
18. Price v. Wisconsin M. & F. Ins. Co., 43 Wis. 267 (1887).
19. Levi v. Booth, 38 Md. 305 (1882). The buyer is protected by the Maryland
Factors' Act "notwithstanding notice of the fact of their being merely agents or factors,
provided the party dealing with them shall not have notice that they are acting without
authority or mala fide." Id. at 316.
20. Navulshaw v. Brownrigg, 2 De. M. & G. 411, 13 Eng. L. & Eq. 262 (1852).
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of the agency without more will not prevent the person having that notice from
21
seeking the protection of the Factors' Acts. On the other hand, the courts of Ohio,
22
and Pennsylvania
follow the New York view that notice of the agency of itself
is sufficient to exclude a person having such notice from the protection of that Act.
Irrespective of the merits of the difference between New York and Massachusetts
in respect of the policy of such statutes, it appears to be clear enough that there
is no longer any reason why New York should extend the scope of its Factors' Act
beyond the presently existing limits. This is true because with the widespread general employment of commercial documents of title as a means of execution of transactions of pledge and sale, it would seem that the protection afforded by Factors'
Acts has progressively become of less consequence. Indeed, the principal cases in
which the Factors' Act has been construed in New York have involved litigation
over pawnbrokerage transactions. 23 Moreover, if it can be said that it was the
intention of the legislatures in enacting such statutes to limit their protection to
purchasers or pledgees who are wholly innocent, New York would appear to be the
sounder view.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-DIvERsITY

OF

CITIZENSHIP-INTERVENING

CHANGE

IN

STATE LAw.-The plaintiff, an employee of the defendant corporation, brought an
action for damages resulting from contracting silicosis, an occupational disease, while
working in the company's glass factory, which was negligently maintained. A United
States district court, having jurisdiction because of diversity of citizenship of the
parties, dismissed the complaint pursuant to the then settled law of the State wherein
the cause of action arose because an employer's compliance with the Workman's
Compensation Act barred any common law action in negligence. Pending the appeal
of the case to the circuit court of appeals, the highest Ohio State court reversed its
former decisions and held such occupational disease compensable under the common
law. On appeal, held, where a state court decision intervenes subsequent to the
judgment of the district court, and before the decision of an appeal, and positively
changes the rule which governs, the appeal couirt must follow the latest decision.
Judgment reversed. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 347 (1941).'
21. Cleveland, Brown & Co. v. Shoeman, 40 Ohio St. 183 (1883).
22. Macky v. Dillinger, 73 Pa. 85 (1873).
23. Sweet & Co., Inc. v. Provident Loan Soc., 279 N. Y. 540, 18 N. E. (2d) 847 (1939);
Nelkin v. Provident Loan Soc., 265 N. Y. 393, 193 N. E. 245 (1934); Commercial Credit
Corp. v. Northern Westchesfer Bank, 256 N. Y. 482, 177 N. E. 12 (1931); Schmidt v.
Simpson, 204 N. Y. 434, 97 N. E. 966 (1912); Freudenheim v. Gutter, 201 N. Y. 94,
94 N. E. 640 (1911); Mann v. R. Simpson Co., 257 App. Div. 329, N. Y. S. (2d) (1st
Dep't 1939); G. Dewey Sullivan Inc. v. H. Stern Inc., 148 Misc. 235, 265 N. Y. Supp. 481
(Munic. Ct. 1933).
*. In its opinion the Court said: "... until such time as a case is no longer sub judice,
the duty rests upon federal courts to apply state law under the Rules of Decision statute
in accordance with the then controlling decision of the highest state court." The Rules
of Decision statute is the former 34th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. It provides:
"Laws of Stateg as rules of decision. The laws of the.several States, except where the
Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall
be regaded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States,
in cases where they apply." 28 U. S. C. A. § 725.
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This case stands fbr "the proposition that if the 'highest judicial tribunal of the
state adopts new vievs as to the construction of a state statute and reverses its
former decisions, the federal courts must follow the latest adjudication even where
the decision intervenes between the judgment of the trial court and the subsequent
appeal of the case.2 This principle, although of ancient origin,3 was followed only
fitfully by the federal courts because its soundness was questioned considerably by
the doctrine of Gelpcke v. Dubuque.4 Prior to the ruling of the principal case, the
federal courts, in refusing, in diversity of citizenship cases, to follow superseding
decisions of the highest state courts on the construction of state statutes, justified their position either on the ground of an independent federal jurisprudence, 5
or on the ground that a subsequent change of state law could not have a retroactive effect on accrued rights, 6 or because on a writ of error to the federal
courts the sole function of the appellate tribunal is to determine whether the lower
court correctly applied the state law which prevailed at the time of entry of judgment.7 The theory of an independent federal jurisprudence was discarded in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins.8 The writ of error theory and also the theory that a subsequent change of state law could not affect accrued rights has been discarded by
the United States Supreme Court in the principal caseP There is now left to the
federal courts no precedent for refusing to recognize superseding state decisions.
One of the staunchest of the old cases thus thrown into discard is Gelpcke v.
2. The retroactive effect of this procedure will cause a reversal of lower court judgments
which were correct when entered. The former rule that such action of the state court is
not allowed to retroact upon the judgments of the federal courts, Pease v. Peck, 18 How.
595, 599 (U. S. 1855); Morgan v. Curtenius, 20 How. 1, 3 (U. S. 1857); Burgess v.
Seligman, 107 U. S. 20 (1882); Concordia Ins. Co. v. School Dist., 282 U. S. 545, 553
(1931), is now overruled by the principal case.
3. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110 (U. S. 1801); United States
v. Morrison, 4 Pet. 124 (U. S.1830); Green v. Neal 6 Pet. 291 (U. S. 1832); Carpenter
v. Wabash Ry. Co., 309 U. S.23, 27 (1940).
4. 1 Wall. 175 (U. S.1863), where the appeal court, in deciding on the validity of a
bond issue authorized by the Iowa legislature, followed the law which governed at the
time the bonds were issued, and disregarded an interveifig change of law by the highest
state court which invalidated the issue.
5. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (U. S.1863); Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S.20
(1882).
6. Concordia Ins. Co. v. School Dist., 282 U. S. 545, 553 (1931); Morgan v. Curtenius,
20 How. 1, 3 (U. S. 1857); Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 595, 599 (U. S. 1855).
7. Mulhall v. Keenan, 18 Wall 342 (U. S. 1873); Railway Co. V. Twombly, 100 U. S.78
(1879) ; Edward Hines Trustees v. 'Martin, 268 U. S. 458 (1925).
8. 304 U. S. 64 (1938). Swift v. Tyson;" 16'Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842), overruled by Erie v.
Tompkins, established the doctrine that federal cdurts ,exercising jurisdiction on the ground
of diversity of citizenship, need not, in matters of general jurisprudence, apply the unwritten law of the state as declared by the highest state court, but are free to exercise an
independent judgment as to what the common law of the state is-or should be.
9. The circuit court in its ide'ision of the principal case, Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois
Glass Co., 110 F.'(2d)'310 (C. C. A. 6th,'1940), referred to the writ of error theory and
'the non-retroactivity theory as the basis of its decision. However, the Supreme Court in
the principal case overrules the circuit court.
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Dubuque'° which was predicated on the ground that the federal courts when exercising jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship are free to formulate their own
rules in matters of general law despite state court decisions on the subject. 1 This
they are no longer free to do under the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
which makes the latest settled decision of the state court, legislative or judicial,
binding on the federal courts. Under the doctrine of the principal case the federal
courts must follow existing law even if it be necessary to reverse a judgment which
was right when entered, for to affirm it would now be contrary to law. Thus the
Court in Gelpcke v. Dubuque could not today ignore the latest decision of the highest
12
state court even though it intervened between the trial and the appeal of the case.
In diversity of citizenship cases it had been the general practice of the federal
courts in early times to follow only the highest state court decisions on the construction of the laws and Constitutions of their states. 13 This rule was subsequently
modified by the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Hilt1 4 and Erie Railroad Co.
v. Duplak,'5 wherein the federal courts were bound to follow lower state court decisions as well. The lower federal courts, however, were not unanimous in applying
this rule as many of them felt that the old rule had not been disturbed. 16 The re10. 1 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863). See, McCormick & Hewins, The Collapse of "General
Law" in the Federal Courts (1938) 33 ILL. L. Rav. 126, 137. Assuming the validity of
this conclusion, one commentator suggests that a failure to apply the rule of Gelpcke v.
Dubuque will result in a denial of due process of law. See Shulman, The Demise of Swift
v. Tyson (1938) 47 YALs, L. J. 1336, 1351; Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S.
673 (1930); Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil Co., 287 U. S. 358 (1932).
11. See this explanation of the Gelpcke case in Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444,
450-451 (1924).
12. The dissenting opinion of Miller, J., in the very case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque is
of significance in considering this conclusion. He argued, with striking force, that on the
construction and effect of a state statute the latest decision of the highest state court is
binding even though it intervenes between the trial and appeal of a case. The principal
case is essentially a reiteration of this contention and, by implication, an adoption of it.
The attitude of the present Supreme Court with reference to Gelpcke v. Dubuque, is easily
discernible from the remark of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U. S. 703, 706 (1939), withdrawn on rehearing by order of
the Court, 308 U. S. 530 (1940), where, speaking generally of retroactive decisions, he said:
"But the discouraging history of such a juristic sport as was the doctrine of Gelpcke v.
Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, admonishes us to adhere to a state court's declaration of its own
law even though it has had a checkered unfolding." It would now seem beyond all cavil
that Gelpcke v. Dubuque is gone.
13. Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361 (U. S. 1826); McCluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270 (U. S.
1830); Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297 (U. S. 1850); Webster v. Cooper, 14
How. 488 (U. S. 1852); Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152 (U. S. 1825); Leffingwell v.
Warren, 2 Black 599 (U. S. 1862).
14. 247 U. S. 97, 100 (1918).
15. 286 U. S. 440, 444 (1932).
16. In re F. & D. Co., 256 Fed. 73, 76 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919); Damen & Jarvis Bldg. Corp.
v. Mechanics' Ins. Co., 83 F. (2d) 793 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936); Anglo-American Land Co.
v. Lombard, 132 Fed. 721, 741 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904); Irving National Bank v. Law, 9 F.
(2d) 536, 537 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
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cently decided case of Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field17 serves to resolve these
conflicting interpretations and clarifies and settles the rule. In that case a federal
district court, having jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, followed the
decisions of two inferior New Jersey courts interpretative of a state statute. The
circuit court reversed the district court and refused to follow the state court decisions
holding that it was bound only by a pronouncement of the highest state court. On
appeal to the Supreme Court it was held that on the construction and effect of a
state statute the federal courts are bound to follow inferior state court decisions in
the absence of more convincing evidence of what the state law is. This decision
tends to substantiate the dissenting opinion of Justice Miller in Gelpcke v. Dubuque
wherein he argued that the latest pronouncement of the highest state court on the
construction of a state statute must be followed even though it intervenes between
the trial and subsequent appeal of a case and changes the law which prevailed at
the time of entry of judgment.
The raison d'etre of the principal case is the decision of the Supreme Court in the
celebrated case of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins which wrote finis to the doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson.' s The doctrine of the Erie case raised many problems, among them
the question of the effect to be given by the federal courts to the decisions of inferior
state courts, 19 in the absence of any ruling by the highest state court; and the effect
to be given to outmoded or incorrect decisions of the highest state courts. The Court
has since broadened the doctrine of the Erie case by announcing the following curative rules: (1) The federal courts must follow the highest state court decisions unless
the highest state court has later given clear and persuasive indication that its pronouncement will be modified, limited or restricted;20 (2) In the absence of a ruling
by the highest state court the federal courts are bound to follow lower state court
by other persuasive data that the highest state
decisions unless they are convinced
21
court would decide otherwise.
The effect of these limitations is to permit the federal courts to reincarnate Swift
v. Tyson wherever they apply. Under Swift v. Tyson, the federal courts, in exercising an independent judgment decided cases as they thought the state court should
decide them. Now the federal courts in the absence of an authoritative ruling by
any state court, may decide cases as they think the state court would decide them.
This is at least the ghost of Swift v. Tyson. The evil under the old doctrine was
the conflict of federal and state laws on the same question. Under the new doctrine
there will still be the question of the weight to be given a federal court decision on
the construction of a state statute where there are no state decisions. The fate of
a federal court decision in diversity cases now rests solely with the state courts, and
17. 311 U. S. 169 (1940).
18. After a troubled existence of almost 100 years the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson was
discarded in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), which held that a federal
court exercising jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, is no longer free to treat
the question as one of so-called "general law," but must apply the State law, both statutory
and as declared by the highest state court.
L. Ray. 438. The Erie case merely bound the federal
19. See, (1938) 7 Foson~m
courts to follow the "highest" state court decisions.
20. Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Bank of Wichita Falls, 306 U. S. 103,
107 (1939).
21. West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U. S. 223 (1940).
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ultimately with the highest state court. Whenever a federal court follows a lower
state court decision the soundness of its decision will be in direct ratio to the soundness of the state court decision and will always be tainted with some degree of
doubt. 22 An adverse decision of the intermediate appellate court will have a corresponding effect on the federal court decision, and whatever be the ruling of the highest state court, it will have to act accordingly. Thus, the ultimate outcome of a
case in the federal judicial system will be patterned on the treatment it receives
in the state judicial system.23 Logically, the doctrine of these cases will make the
federal courts a mere registry 24 of state court decisions-a judicial automaton-for
they are now under a mandate to follow and obey the state courts, humbly, without
25
question, and even resignedly.
The theory of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins and the cases which spring from it now
conclude the doctrine that when the federal courts are called upon to apply local
law, the decision of any state court, whether expressive of the common law or interpretative of statute law, and decisions of the highest state court which change the
law and intervene between the trial and appeal of a case, are "laws" 26 within the
meaning of the Rules of Decision statute, and must be followed by the federal courts
with the exceptions noted; and that the function of the federal courts in diversity
of citizenship cases, is only to declare the law of the state and not to make it.27
The metamorphosis of the federal courts from independent tribunals to subsidiaries
of the state courts is now complete.
CONTRACTS-PERFORMANCE AS CONSIDERATION FOR A BAD BILATERAL CONTRACT.-

The plaintiff, proceeding in equity, pleaded a verbal agreement whereby the defendant,
in consideration for the plaintiff's promise to open up and develop three specified
22. While the federal courts are now bound by lower state court decisions the state
appellate tribunals are not.
23. Prior to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, such a condition of servitude was contemplated,
decried and rejected by the Supreme Court in Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20 (1882),
which case has been overruled by the principal case.
24. This suggestion is not too startling when one considers the reasoning behind Article
III of the Federal Constitution which provides for federal jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases. The Framers of the Constitution felt that if a suit between citizens of
different states was brought in a state court, the court might be prejudiced in favor of the
citizen of the forum. Therefore to prevent such a breach of justice the federal courts were
given jurisdiction in such cases. United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 87 (U. S. 1809);
Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 354 (U. S. 1855); Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co.,
235 U. S. 461, 478 (1915); Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 34 (1882). Warren, New

Light on the History of the Federal Jutdiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37 HARv. L. REv. 49,
82-88, proves that it was always the intent of the framers that the federal courts should
follow both the common and statute law of the state.
25. West v. American Tel. &' Tel. Co., 311 U. S. 223 (1940), binds the federal courts
to follow the state courts even though they think the state court is wrong.
26. In Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842), Mr. Justice Story, in construing the 34th
section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (now 28 U. S. C. A. § 725) held that the term "laws"
embraced the statute law, but' not the common law of the states.
27. This was the core of the argument of Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion
in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349 (1910).
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territories for the sale of the defendant's products, agreed to grant the plaintiff
an exclusive agency for the sale of those products in those territories, and to pay to
the plaintiff a specified commission on all -products sold in those territories. He
further alleged that this agreement was to continue, in effect as long as the defendant
continued to sell its products in those territories. At the trial, the plaintiff presented
proof to the effect that with the defendant's cooperation, he had made persistent
efforts to create in those areas a market for the defendant's products, and that these
efforts contributed to a marked increase of sales over a period of years. On April 9,
1935, the defendant, without admitting a contract to exist, notified the plaintiff that
if any existed, it was hereby terminated. On cross appeals, on certified questions,
held, two judges dissenting in part, that the plaintiff was entitled to an accounting
for commissions on products sold in the territories "up to but not after April 9,
1935. Judgment of the Appellate Division affirmed. 1 Rubin v. Dairymen's League
Co-op. Ass'n, 284 N. Y. 32, 29 N. E. (2d) 458 (1940).
The trial court, finding that the agreement was "unilateral as to time", 2 and without
deciding whether plaintiff's promise to open up and develop the territories was
sufficiently definite and certain to constitute a valid consideration, proceeded upon
the theory that upon performance by the plaintiff, the defendant became liable for
the agreed commissions on all sales3 made in the territories up until the time it gave
notice of termination. This theory was apparently approved by the Appellate Division. 4 Whether or not the Court'of Appeals followed this theory or found some
sort of unilateral contract is not clear, However, whether or not the actual decision
rests on the point, the court used language to the effect that the law is that even
though one of the promises contained in a bilateral agreement is too indefinite when
made to support the contract, 5 still upon performance, a valid unilateral contract
arises.6 The court apparently cited 7 the case of Grossman v. Sclenker8 as supporting
1. Rubin v. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, 259 App. Div. 23, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 466
(3d Dep't 1940).
2. With reference to this finding the Court of Appeals said: "We treat that phrase
as referring to an agency cancelable at will . . . 'the agency was one at will, and might
be terminated by either party, upon the payment by the defendant of any commissions
which had been earned up to the time that notice of termination was given'." Rubin v.
Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, 284 N. Y. 32, 38, 29 N. E. (2d) 458, 460 (1940).
3. This fact is very important. If the defendant's agreement was merely to pay a
commission on products actually sold by the plaintiff, then there would be little difficulty
in construing the arrangement as a valid unilateral contract.
4. Rubin v. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, 259 App. Div. 23, 25, 18 N. Y. S. (2d)
466, 469 (3d Dep't 1940).
5. Although it has been questioned, it seems to be well settled that if one promise in
a bilateral agreement is not bindingon its face, the result is that both promises fail for
lack of consideration. Harrison v. Cage, 5 Mod. 410, 87 Eng. Reprints 736 (K. B. 1697).
See Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Cooper's Glue Factory, 231 N. Y. 459, 462, 132 N. E. 148, 149
(1921): "Unless both parties to a contract are bound, so that either can sue the other
for a breach, neither is bound." For a criticism of the rule, see Oliphant, Mutuality of
Obligation in Bilateral Contracts at Lawn (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 705; (1928) 28 CoL.
L. R v. 997.
6. Rubin v. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, 284 N. Y. 32, 38, 29 N. E. (2d) 458,
460 (1940).
7. Referring to the defendant's argument that the contract was void for lack of
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this proposition. It is submitted that that case neither holds nor contains language
supporting such a proposition. 9 The other authority cited by the court is Professor
Williston who writes: "A promise that was originally too indefinite, may by performance become definite and as the party to the bargain must be regarded as continuously assenting to receive such performance in return for his own promise, a valid
unilateral contract arises on receipt of such performance." 10 Since this text was cited
with approval by the court,11 its soundness should be considered, even though the
For it is in this way that novel propositions
result can be justified on other grounds.
12
often work their way into the law.
Consideration is required by the common law in order to support a special promise
not under seal. It may consist of either an act or a promise. However, whether
it be an act or a promise, it must be of such a nature as to fall within what the
law classifies as good consideration. Otherwise it will not support a contract.' 3
Moreover not only must the act or promise be of such a nature as to be capable
of being consideration, but it must be treated as such by the parties. 14 Thus neither
an act nor a promise can constitute good consideration unless it is done by the
promisee at the request of the promisor and in reliance upon the promise. 15 From
mutuality because plaintiff's promise to open up and develop was too indefinite to be
enforceable, the court said: "Such an argument disregards the rule that 'Even when the
obligation of a unilateral promise is suspended for want of mutuality at its inception, still,
upon performance by the promisee, a consideration arises which relates back to the making of the promise; and it becomes obligatory.' Grossman v. Schenker, 206 N. Y. 466, 468,
100 N. E. 39, 40." Rubin v. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, 284 N. Y. 32, 37, 29 N. E.
(2d) 458, 460 (1940).
8. 206 N. Y. 466, 100 N. E. 39 (1912).
9. The holding of the case was that there was a valid bilateral contract because the
defendant's promise to pay was supported by the plaintiff's implied in fact promise to
superintend: The dictum quoted, note 7 supra, merely means that when a promisor makes
an offer looking towards an acceptance by an act, his promise does not become binding
until that act is performed, but that upon performance it does become binding. This is
true of every unilateral contract. See Petterson v. Pattberg, 248 N. Y. 86, 161 N. E. 428
(1928).
10. 1 WnIsToN, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 106; accord, RESTATFIENT, CONTRACTS
(1932) §§ 33, 63.
11. See Rubin v. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, 284 N. Y. 32, 38, 29 N. E. (2d)
458, 460.
12. "There is danger that by frequent repetitions and piling up assertions, judges citing
and quoting textbooks, and text writers citing the cases thus referring to them, a false
doctrine might acquire strength enough to dispute with the true;" Campbell, C. J., in
Tribbette v. Illinois Central R.R., 70 Miss. 182, 12 So. 32, 33 (1888).
13. Thus the payment or promise of payment of a matured debt is not sufficient consideration for the creditor's new promise. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 120.
Nor is performance or a promise of performance of a duty imposed by law a sufficient
consideration. Id. § 132. As to illusory promises see note 5 supra.
14. "Nothing is consideration that is not regarded as such by both parties." Philpot v.
Gruninger, 14 Wall. 570, 577 (U. S. 1871). "It is not enough that the promise induces
the detriment or that the detriment induces the promise if the other half is wanting."
Mr. Justice Holmes in Wis. & Mich. R.R. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 386 (1903).
15. As is well known, the action of special assumpsit arose out of trespass on the case.
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these principles it follows that where an offeror requests a promise, that promise
must be made, and mere performance of the act which is the subject matter of
the promise will not suffice.' 0 If this were not true, then the whole theory that
contractual liability is dependent on the performance by the promisee of some act
or promise at the request of the promisor and in reliance on his promise, would be
destroyed,' 7 and contractual liability would rest on an estoppel theory.
That certain promises and acts do not constitute good consideration, even though
they are made or done at the request of the promisor, and in reliance upon his
promise, is an equally well settled principle in the common law doctrine of contracts.
Falling within this class are promises which are so indefinite and uncertain that it
is possible for the promisee to perform it according to its terms, without detriment
to himself, or benefit to the promisor.' 8 In the principal case, the court apparently
assumed that the plaintiff's promise was such a promise.' 9 The essence of the
defendant's argument was that since the promise which the plaintiff made at the
request of the defendant was such a promise, 20 the parties never entered into a valid
bilateral contract. The plaintiff's answer to this argument is that he had performed
his promise in such a way that if he had clearly promised to do, what he in fact
did under his promise, the original promise would have constituted good consideration.
In the leading case of Strogg v. Sheffield, 2 ' the Court of Appeals rejected such an
The gist of the action was that the deceit of the promisor in breaching his promise, caused
damage to the promisee, since he had been induced to part with his money or property on
the faith of it. See Ames, The History of Assuntpsit (1888) 2 HAnv. L. Rrv. 1, 14.
16. "In order to make a bargain it is necessary that the acceptor shall give in return
for the offeror's promise exactly the consideration which the offeror requests. If an act
is requested, that very act and no other must be given. If a promise is requested, that
promise must be made absolutely and unqualifiedly." 1 WMLISrON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed.
1936) § 73.
17. This principle has been shaken to some extent. Thus, under the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859) and in cases where the consideration does not move from
the promisee, a benefit to the promisor will suffice. However, as these cases are an exception to the general rule, cases which do not come squarely within the exception should
be controlled by general principles, and not by the principle underlying the exception.
Moreover, even though a benefit to the promisor will suffice, the promisor is entitled to
the precise benefit for which he bargained.
It is to be noted that in England the rule still is that the consideration must move from
the promisee. "A second principle is that if a person with whom a contract not under
seal has been made is to be able to enforce it consideration must have been given by him
to the promisor or to some other person at the promisor's request." Dunlop Pneumatic
Tyre Co. v. Selfridge, [1915] A. C. 847, 853.
18.

1 WrMSTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 104.

19. See note 7 supra.
20. Promises to work for another, which fail to specify the nature of the work have
been held to be illusory promises. See Chard v. Ryan-Parker Const. Co., 182 App. Div.
455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 622 (1st Dep't 1918); Winslow v. Mayo, 123 App. Div. 758, 108
N. Y. Supp. 640 (2d Dep't 1908), aff'd withoza opinion 195 N. Y. 551, 88 N. E. 1135
(1909); Terre Haute Brewing Co. v. Dugan, 102 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939); Jas.
Barclay & Co. v. Bailey, 34 F. Supp. 665 (E. D. Tenn. 1940).
21. 144 N. Y. 392, 39 N. E. 390 (1895).
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argument. There the defendant had indorsed a matured note in consideration for the
plaintiff's promise to forbear from suing the maker until such time as he wanted
the money. The court, after pointing out that a request to forbear, followed by
forbearance for a reasonable time would give rise to a valid unilateral contract, held
that where an illusory promise to forbear was requested and given, subsequent
forbearance for a reasonable time could not give rise to a valid contract. "The consideration is to be tested by the agreement, and not by what was done under it,"22
said the court. Thus the proposition of the court was that where the promisor requests an illusory promise, a valid contract cannot arise without more on the part
of the promisor. Although possibly harsh law, this view would seem to be sound
law. The contrary rule of the present case overemphasizes the importance of performance, which in a bilateral contract is not the consideration, but at most a condition precedent to the bringing of the action.23 By forging a good unilateral
contract out of a bad bilateral contract, a court disregards the fact that the promisor
did not request an act in return for his promise. In effect, it is allowing a person
who has performed an act in reliance upon a promise, but not at the request of the
promisor, to recover. In substance, this amounts to sustaining a recovery on the
theory of promissory estoppel, a doctrine which heretofore has been rejected in New
York, with the possible exception of the troublesome cases involving charitable
subscriptions.2 4 The argument that the performance of an act which comes within
the scope of the promise, and which could constitute consideration, is a performance of the contract, assumes the very point in question, viz., the existence of a valid
contract. 25 The argument that it is only just that the promisor should perform
inasmuch as he has received everything which he expected to receive, ignores the
fact that either the promisor did not receive the precise thing which he reqiested, viz.,
a promise binding on its face, or, if he did receive what he requested, in this case
an illusory promise, the promise which he gave in return for it was a mere gratuitous
26
promise.
22. Id. at 396. (Italics supplied.)
23. It is possible to have a bilateral contract where each promise is independent of and
not conditioned on performance by the other party. See 3 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed.
1936) § 663 et seq.
24. See I. & I. Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 276 N. Y. 427, 12 N. E. (2d) 532 (1938);
Alleghany College v. Nat. Chautauqua C. Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927).
25. "Continuing in the employment was not a part performance of a contract, for none
had been made." Petze v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 125 App. Div. 267, 270, 109 N.
Y. Supp. 328, 330 (2d Dep't 1908).
26. Consider the case of a promise by A to pay B $100 in consideration for B's promise
that on a future day, he will either swim across the Hudson River or pay a matured debt
which he owes to a third party. It seems clear that if B, relying on this promise, paid the
debt that he owed to the third person, he could not recover. Why then should he recover
on the contract, if, in reliance upon the promise, he swims across the Hudson River? It
is true that he was not bound to swim across thd river, while he was bound to pay the
debt. Nevertheless, he did not swim across the river at the request of A. The only thing
which he did do at A's request was to make a promise which he cofuld have" performed without incurring a detriment to himself. Therefore, tested at the" time the agreement was
made, B's promise did not constitute good consideration, and hence, As promise was merely
a gratuitous promise.
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It is possible that on some future day the Court of Appeals, when the question
is squarely before27 it will tell us that the facts of the principal case warranted the
conclusion that a valid unilateral contract was actually intended. In other words,
they might say that the defendant did not bargain for a promise to work, but for
a continuing series of acts. Yet even to sustain the result on this theory would not
be altogether without difficulty. In the first place, there is the objection
that a bilateral contract was pleaded.2 8 Secondly, the same objection as to indefiniteness is present, for an act requested can be just as indefinite as a promise.
Thirdly,
there would be the difficulty of explaining some of the language used by the
29
court.

Perhaps the simplest ground on which to rest the case would be that there was a
general hiring within the rule of Watson v. Gugino. ° The result would be that there
was a contract for service, terminable by either party at will. Under such contract,
compensation, instead of being fixed at so much per unit of time, would be fixed
at a given percentage of the sales made in the territory until termination. The consideration would not be any promise by the plaintiff, but the services performed by
him during the life of the arrangement.

DECEDENT'S ESTATE-SURROGATE'S COURT-EQUITABLE JURISDICTION IN A DisCOVERY PROCEEDING.-An administrator initiated a proceeding in discovery in the

surrogate's court to compel delivery of property asserted to belong to the estate.
Respondents' answer interposed a claim of title. They produced in support of their
claim a contract allegedly executed by the decedent shortly before his death, purporting to transfer to them, while decedent was still alive, title to the property in
question. Petitioner contended that the contract, if actually executed, was procured
by fraud, duress, and undue influence, held, a determination of the issues raised by
these defenses is beyond the competence of the surrogate in a discovery proceeding.
The surrogate's court might decide the question of legal title, but once such a title
was found to have passed, it was powerless to avoid or cancel it on equitable grounds.
27. For a discussion of the problem, and the cases in New York, see Finn, The Forging
of Good Unilaterals Out of Bad Bilaterals (1933) 3 BRooxsru L. REv. 6.
The only New York case cited by Professor Williston as supporting the rule that upon
performance a bad bilateral contract can become a good unilateral contract, is the case of
Grundt v. Shenk, 222 App. Div. 82, 225 N. Y. Supp. 317 (2d Dep't 1927), aff'd wdthout
opinion 248 N. Y. 602, 162 N. E. 541 (1928). See 1 WILLISTON, CONTra'RS (rev. ed. 1936)
§ 106, n. 7. But cf. Ide v. Brown, 178 N. Y. 26, 70 N. E. 101 (1904).
28. "It is a fundamental rule that judgment shall be secundum aluegata et probata, and
...any departure from that rule is certain to produce surprise, confusion, and injustice."
Romeyn v. Sichles, 108 N. Y. 650, 652, 15 N. E. 698, 699 (1888).
29. At one point the court, without stating what it was, refers to "the obligation assumed
by the plaintiff." Rubin v. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, 284 N. Y. 32, 40, 29 N. E.
(2d) 458, 461 (1940). Almost in the next breath, it held that it could not interfere with
the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff did not assume a continuing duty as did
the plaintiff in the case of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 118 N. E. 214
(1917). It is fundamental that the non-promising party to a unilateral contract does not
assume an obligation.
30.

204 N. Y. 535, 98 N. E. 18 (1912).
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The surrogate has jurisdiction in discovery only when the decedent has died possessed
of a legal title to the property in question. Matter of Ericson, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 25,
1940, p. 1260, col. 5 (Surr. Ct. 1940); also Matter of Tietjen, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 22,
1940, p. 1201, col. 7 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
The history of both the legal and equitable jurisdiction of the surrogate's court
for the past quarter of a century has been characterized by a steady expansion.
"Concentration of jurisdiction as to decedents' estates has been the purpose and
result of successive legislation and judicial decisions."'3
2
The enlargement of the scope of the discovery process is striking evidence of this.
The proceeding has for its ultimate object the reduction to possession of personal
property3 held by another and claimed to belong to the estate or the delivery to
claimants of such property asserted to be improperly withheld by the deceased's
representatives. Of statutory origin, discovery originally was primarily inquisitorial
in character. A party believed to be in possession of money or chattels belonging
to decedent at the time of his death, 4 or believed to have knowledge of the location
of such property, could be compelled by an order of the surrogate to appear and
testify as to such possession or such knowledge.5 If it appeared upon the hearing
that the respondent, claiming no title, was in fact in possession of money or chattels
belonging to the petitioner the court could direct their surrender. Prior to 1914,
however, an admission of possession, coupled with a "substantial" claim of title
sufficed to oust the surrogate of jurisdiction. 6 He could not try the question of title
and the parties would be thereupon remitted to the supreme court for a trial of
that issue.
B'y the New York Laws of 1914, Chapter 443. the legal power of the surrogate
in a discovery proceeding was considerably expanded. He was enabled thereafter to
try the question of title whenever such question was raised by the respondent. Of
late years the proceeding has assumed many of the features of a replevin action in
the supreme court and the respondent has been held to be constitutionally entitled
1. Matter of Haigh, 125 Misc. 365, 368, 211 N. Y. Supp. 521, 524 (Surr. Ct. 1925).
2.

N. Y. Laws 1914, c. 443, N. Y. Laws 1921, c. 439, N. Y. Laws 1924, c. 100, repre-

sent the major statutory innovations. See Matter of Peno, 128 Misc. 718, 221 N. Y. Supp.
205 (Surr. Ct. 1927).

3. Discovery will lie only to recover specific personal property or a specific fund. It
will not' lie to collect a debt. Matter of Arduini, 243 App. Div. 10, 276 N. Y. Supp. 90
(1st Dep't 1934) ; Matter of Hammer, 237 App. Div. 497, 261 N. Y. Supp. 478 (4th Dep't
1933), aff'd, 261 N. Y. 677, 185 N. E. 789 (1933). Discovery will not lie to enforce a
contract obligation. Matter of Thomas, 235 App. Div. 455, 257 N. Y. Supp. 336 (1st
Dep't 1932); Matter of Campbell, 145 Misc. 389, 260 N. Y. Supp. 285 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
4. See Mafter of Cofer, 121 Misc. 292, 200 N. Y. Supp. 906 (Surr. Ct. 1923); Matter
of Hyams, 237 N. Y. 211, 142 N. E. 389 (1923), holding that discovery would not lie to
recover property transferred by decedent in his lifetime nor to recover the proceeds of
property diverted. By N. Y. Laws 1924, c. 100, this ruling was overcome. Matter of
Wilson, 252 N. Y. 155, 109 N. E. 122 (1929). The amendment was suggested in the
Cofer case.
5. See N. Y. SURROOATe'S COURT Acr §§ 205, 206, 206-A.
6. N. Y. Laws 1903, c. 526, authorized the surrogate to retain jurisdiction of the
proceeding when respondent's claim of title was clearly baseless. See Matter of Reinze,
224 N. Y. 1. 120 N. E. 63 (1918).
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7
to a jury trial of his allegations of ownership. However, the statute itself empowers
the surrogate to impress a trust on the proceeds of estate property unlawfully
diverted or to "make any determination which a court of equity might decree in
s
following trust property or funds."
It has been held in the instant case that, although the surrogate may in discovery
try the issue of whether or not legal title was in fact transferred to the respondent,
once such a transfer is found to have been made by decedent in his lifetime the
surrogate is divested of jurisdiction. It is offered in justification that, assuming the
transfer to be voidable in equity on the ground of fraud or undue influence, the
decedent is at best the owner of a mere chose in action. This would, to be sure,
pass as part of his estate and would be enforceable by the estate representative in
the supreme court. But the action there is one in personam, whereas discovery is a
proceeding in rem, requiring a specific subject-matter. Moreover, the transfer of
title here was an inter vivos transaction and one therefore, it was assumed by the
court, not cognizable in the surrogate's court. Jurisdiction in discovery, so the
argument would run, can be invoked only where specific money or property is
involved and where decedent, at the time of his death, held a legal title to the
money or property in question.
The in personam-in rem dichotomy, like the term jurisdiction, is one of multiple
meaning. Had the estate representatives elected to seek damages -for the alleged
fraud, then clearly the action would have been in personam, in the double sense
that their claim would be enforceable only against the respondents, and that, assuming personal jurisdiction, it would be satisfied out of respondent's general assets.
But that is not the situation here. The estate representative has elected instead to
avoid the contract and seek its cancellation. His claim is, ultimately, for the specific
property obtained by the respondents pursuant to the contract. In that sense it is
a claim in rem and within the scope of the discovery statutes.
The contention, advanced by this court, that because the transaction was inter
vivos the surrogate is divested of jurisdiction is equally difficult to support. By
New York Laws of 1924, Chapter 100, the surrogate, in discovery, was authorized
to direct delivery of property "whether . . .possession or control was obtained in
the lifetime of a decedent or subsequent to his death." It is not apparent why the
rule should be otherwise when, in addition to possession, a bare legal title, voidable
in equity, is acquired.
The discovery proceeding is applicable, under Section 205 of the New York Surrogate's Court Act, to all money or specific personal property "which should be delivered or paid to the petitioner." Section 40, subdivision 4 of the New York Surro'gate's Court Act empowers the surrogate "to enforce against a respondent delivery
of personal property, or the payment of the proceeds or value of personal property
belonging to or withheld from an estate." It requires an extremely narrow construc-

7. Matter of Nutrizio, 211 App. Div. 8, 206 N. Y. Supp. 706 (1st Dep't 1924); Matter
-of Comfort, 234 App. Div. 19, 253 N. Y. Supp. 796 (2d Dep't 1931); Matter of Pritchard,
227 App. Div. 105, 237 N. Y. Supp. 156 (4th Dep't 1929). The characterization of discovery as basically an action 'in replevin has been offered to justify a dismissal of an
equitable defense of laches on the ground that the legal statute of limitations applied and
had not run. Matter of Hagen, 157 Misc. 378, 283 N. Y. Supp. 605 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
8. N. Y. SuRnocAm's COURT Acr § 205. See also N. Y. SURROGATE's COURT ACr §§ 206,
206-A.
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tion of this language to justify the holding that it is inapplicable to claims enforceable in a court of equity. But that is the logical, if unavowed, basis of the decision.
It is submitted that, in view of the statutory history of the equitable jurisdiction
of the surrogate's court, this conception is untenable.
The first major step in enlarging the equitable authority of the surrogate's court
was also taken in 1914. Prior to that time it had been held that the surrogate had
only such equitable power as had been specifically conferred upon him by statute. 9
New York Laws 'of 1914, Chapter 443, empowered the surrogate:
"... upon the return of any process to try and determine all questions, legal or equitable,
arising between any or all of the parties to any proceeding, or between any party and
any other person having any claim or interest therein who voluntarily appears in such
proceeding, or is brought in by supplemental citation, as to any and all matters necessary
to be determined in order to make a full, equitable and complete disposition of the matter
°
by such order or decree as justice requires."'
The interpretation of this section by the courts in such cases as Matter of Mondshain,11 a discovery proceeding,' 2 resulted, however, in a veritable emasculation of
the legislative purpose.
In Matter of Mondshain the respondents produced in support of their allegation
of title a release under seal, executed by the decedent, of all claims to the property
involved. Petitioner asserted that the release had been procured by the fraud of
the respondents. The appellate division--despite the fact that the surrogate had
the power ". . . to try and determine all questions, legal or equitable . . ."-held
that he had no jurisdiction to set aside a release on this equitable ground.
The argument of the court turned on a rule of statutory construction. The language of the enactment above quoted was followed by the phrase: "in the cases
and in the manner prescribed by statute", with an enumeration'immediately thereafter of specific powers of the surrogate. It was contended in Matter of Mondshain
that the general grant of equitable jurisdiction made by the New York Laws of 1914,
Chapter 443, was limited by the specific enumeration immediately following it, so
that the equitable power of the surrogate could be exercised only in one of the
enumerated categories. The type of power exercised in a discovery proceeding did
not become part of this enumeration until 1924.13
9. See Matter of Schnabel, 202 N. Y. 134, 95 N. E. 698 (1911).
10. This language is now part of N. Y. SURROGAT'S COuRT AcT § 40, entitled "General
Jurisdiction of the Surrogate's Court."
11. 186 App. Div. 528, 174 N. Y. Supp. 599 (1st Dep't 1919).
12. Matter of Holzworth, 166 App. Div. 150, 151 N. Y. Supp. 1072 (2d Dep't 1915),
aff'd, 215 N. Y. 700, 109 N. E. 1079 (1915), an accounting proceeding, is to the same
effect. It is in the Holzworth case that the argument advanced in Matter of Mondshain
was first employed.
13. By N. Y. Laws 1924, c. 100, N. Y. SUROoATe'S COURT AcT § 40, subd. 4 was
amended, and the following language added thereto: ". . . to enforce against a respondent
the delivery of personal property, or the payment of the proceeds or value of personal
property belonging to or withheld from the estate." The amendment was directed at
Matter of Hyams, 237 N. Y. 211, 142 N. E. 589 (1923) but it would seem to rebut the
argument of the Mondshain case, even in the absence of the 1921 amendment, discussed
infra.
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14
By the New
The Mondshain case remained until 1921 the law in discovery.
York Laws of 1921, Chapter 439, Section 40 of the New York Surrogate's Court
Act was amended and the italicized language below was inserted after the general
grant of equitable jurisdiction and before the phrase quoted above, so that the
paragraph following now reads:
"In addition to and without limitation or,restrictionon the foregoing -powers, each surrogate or surrogate's court shall have power, in the cases and in the manner prescribed by
statute:"

The intent of the amendment was clear. Its broadside was aimed directly at the
Mondshain case. The enumeration held in those cases to be definitive was thereafter
effect of this amendment has, at any rate,
to be merely additive. 5 The salutary
6
been felt in accounting proceedings.'
It has been remarked, however, by way of dictum, that the equitable authority
of the surrogate is less broad in a discovery than in an accounting. 17 The rule in
Raymond v. Davis,'8 where the surrogate was held authorized to direct an accounting of a joint venture, has been said to apply only to an accounting proceeding and
the surrogate has been held powerless to direct a partnership accounting in dis20
Where it has
covery.' 9 Nor may he direct specific performance of contracts.
14. Matter of Heinze, 224 N. Y. 1, 120 N. E. 63 (1918) however, expressly indicates
that the question was, prior to 1921, still open in the Court of Appeals. Even prior to
1921 there was a conflict of authority with respect to the surrogate's power in equity in
accounting proceedings. For cases contra to Matter of Holzworth, 166 App. Div. 150, 151
N. Y. Supp. 1072 (2d Dep't 1915), aff'd, 215 N. Y. 700, 109 N. E. 1079 (1915), see Matter of
Malcolmson, 188 App. Div. 606, 177 N. Y. Supp. 238 (1st Dep't 1919); Matter of Fox,
166 App. Div. 718, 152 N. Y. Supp. 737 (2d Dep't 1915) ; Matter of Coombs, 185 App. Div.
312, 173 N. Y. Supp. 58 (2d Dep't 1918). For an excellent discussion of this conflict see
Matter of Winslow, 151 Misc. 298, 272 N. Y. Supp. 829 (Surr. Ct. 1934) and 1 WAmN's
HEATON, SURROGAT'S CoURS (6th ed. 1940)

§

36.

15. The effect of the 1921 amendment has been summarized generally in 1 WARxr's
HEATON, SUmROOAT's CoUis (6th ed. 1940) § 36. It would seem that the limitations
established by such cases as Matter of Mondshain and Matter of Holzworth ard "precedents of defunct authority". Matter of Ledyard, 170 Misc. 365, 368, 10 N..Y.'Supp. 327
(Sup. Ct. 1939).
16. The surrogate may now, on an accounting, enforce specific performance of contracts to make wills or testamentary dispositions. Matter of Lally, 210 App. Div. 757,
206 N. Y. Supp. 690 (1st Dep't 1924). See, Schley v. Donlin, 131 Misc. 208, 225 N. Y.
Supp. 453 (Sup. Ct. 1927). He may direct an accounting in liquidation of a joint venture.
Matter of Raymond v. Davis, 248 N. Y. 67, 161 N. E. 421 (1928). He may compel an
executor or trustee to account, even when the petitioner has executed a release, if the
release has been procured by fraud. Matter of Malcolmson, 188 App. Div. 606, 177 N. Y.
Supp. 238 (1st Dep't 1919); Matter of Folmsbee, 149 Misc. 426, 268 N. Y. Supp. 309
(Surr. Ct. 1933). In addition he may, in a probate proceeding, enforce an agreement not
to contest a will and give effect to assignments of possible legacies. Matter of Cook, 244
N. Y. 63, 154 N. E. 823 (1926).
17. Matter of Haigh, 125 Misc. 365, 211 N. Y. Supp. 521 (Surr. Ct. 1925).
18. 248 N. Y. 67, 161 N. E. 421 (1928).
19. Matter of Lichtblau, 146 Misc. 278, 261 N. Y. Supp. 863 (Surr. Ct. 1933). The
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been alleged in a discovery proceeding that money was paid by a decedent under
the illusion that it was to be in satisfaction of a legacy made by decedent in his
21
will, the petitioner has been directed to resort to an accounting for a remedy.
Now we are confronted by Matter of Ericson and Matter of Tietjen, containing
perhaps the most severe recent restriction placed upon the exercise of equitable power
by the surrogate in a discovery proceeding.
Decided in a more liberal spirit are such cases as Matter of Theiss,22 in which the
surrogate was held to have power to take and state an account; Matter of Blair,2
in which the surrogate was held to have power in a proceeding "essentially one in
discovery" to compel an estate representative to execute instruments to complete
petitioner's rightful title; Matter of Rosenblath24 holding, on the authority of
Matter of Akin, 25 that the surrogate may2 6in discovery give effect to a contract to
make mutual wills, and Matter of Booth.

There is an abundance of dicta expressing doubt as to the validity of Matter of
Mondshain,27 but Matter of Booth seems a square holding to the contrary. The
testatrix executed a formal deed of gift of certain bonds to the respondents. The
gift was inter vivos. Upon her death, her executor commenced a discovery proceeding for the recovery of the bonds. Respondents produced the deed of gift and contested the jurisdiction of the surrogate's court to entertain petitioner's allegations
of fraud. The surrogate entertained the petition and dismissed it on the merits.
The opinion of the appellate division raised the question of the equitable jurisdiction
of the surrogate and declared Matter of Mondshain to be no longer the law as a
result of the 1921 amendment. Although cited in petitioner's brief, the Booth case,
with its apparent holding to the contrary, is neither cited nor discussed in the Ericson
opinion.
The equitable power of the surrogate would appear to be subject to no such
limitation, as that represented by the instant case, in the protection of creditors of
reason for refusing to extend the rule of Matter of Raymond v. Davis, 248 N. Y. 67,
161 N. E. 421 (1928) is not quite clear. Apparently the court felt that to direct an
accounting would be in effect to enforce payment of a debt for which discovery was not
the appropriate remedy.
20. Matter of Thomas, 235 App. Div. 244, 257 N. Y. Supp. 336 (1st Dep't 1932)
Mafter of Campbell, 145 Misc. 389, 260 N. Y. Supp. 285 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
21. Matter of Landau, 163 Misc. 894, 298 N. Y. Supp. 150 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
22. 161 Misc. 533, 292 N. Y. Supp. 315 (Surr. Ct. 1936). This case relies solely on
Matter of Raymond v. Davis, 248 N. Y. 67, 161,N. E. 421 (1928).
23. 151 Misc. 192, 271 N. Y. Supp. 118 (Surr. Ct. 1934), modified on other gronmds,
242 App. Div. 689, 272 N. Y. Supp. 864 (2d Dep't 1934). See to the same effect, Matter
of Rosenfeld, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 16, 1940, p. 1582, col. 5 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
24. 143 Misc. 640, 257 N. Y. Supp. 856 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
25. 248 N. Y. 202, 161 N. E. 471 (1928).
26. 215 App. Div. 516, 213 N. Y. Supp. 684 (1st Dep't 1926); Matter of Booth, 224
App. Div. 363, 231 N. Y. Supp. 218 (1st Dep't 1928).
27. Matter of Haigh, 125 Misc. 365, 368, 211 N. Y. Supp. 521, 524 (Surr. Ct. 1925);
Matter of Winslow, 151 Misc. 298, 272 N. Y. Supp. 829 (Surr. Ct. 1934); Matter of Cofer,
121 Misc. 292, 200 N. Y. Supp. 906 (Surr. Ct. 1923); Matter of Van Buren v. Estate of
Decker, 204 App. Div. 138, 198 N. Y. Supp. 297 (3rd Dep't 1923) and most notably, Matter
of Raymond v. Davis, 248 N.' Y. 67, 161 N. E. 421 (1928), per Cardozo, Ch. 3.
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an insolvent estate.28 In view of this fact, there seems small reason for such a
severe restriction upon the court's power in the usual case of solvency to protect
the rights of legatees and distributees although admittedly these rights are of another
character. Judge Cardozo's statement in Matter of Raymond v. Davis best resolves
this inconsistency:
"To remit the claimant to another forum after all these advances and retreats, these reconnaissances, and skirmishes, would be a postponement of justice equivalent to a denial. If
anything is due him, he should get it in the forum whose aid he has invoked."
EVIDENcE-ALIBI BILL OF PARTICULARS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.-Two defendants were jointly indicted and tried for burglary. A demand for a bill of particulars
of any alibi defense, served by the district attorney pursuant to the New York Criminal Code was ignored. On trial, one of the defendants, the only witness offered on
their behalf, was not permitted to testify that, about the time of the commission
of the crime, both defendants were at a place other than the scene of the crime. On
appeal from a conviction, held, one judge dissenting, that the conviction should be
reversed as the applicable statute precluding alibi testimony for which a bill of
particulars is not furnished the district attorney before trial does not exclude testimony of defendants, but only of other witnesses. People v. Rakiec, 260 App. Div.
452, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 607 (3rd Dep't 1940).
This case has reopened the discussion of an important legislative aid' to prosecuting
attorneys. The use of the alibi as a defense had been abused and had led to unjust
acquittals because of perjury and surprise, the alibi often being reserved until the
,end of the trial just before the case went to the jury. A prosecutor would find it
almost impossible to rebut such a defense, without prior information as to its intended
use. As a result many states2 have enacted statutes requiring advance notice of the
defense of alibi. 3 Most of the statutes have been recently enacted and there have
been few cases decided under them. During the six years since the enactment of the
New York statute only three cases 4 have arisen under it, the instant case being the
only one to reach the Appellate Division. Michigan 5 and Ohio 6 were the first states
28. N. Y. PERSONA. PROPERTr
N. Y. Supp. 613 (Surr. Ct. 1937).

LAW

§ 19. Matter of St. John, 163 Misc. 17, 296

1. N. Y. CODE CMamL PROC. § 295 1. Cf. N. Y. RUEs Civ. PRAc. 115 (c).
2. At this writing eleven states other than New York have enacted similar laws. They
are: Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin. Cf. OxA. STAT. ANN. (Harlow Supp. 1940) § 3055a.
3. The giving of advance notice allows the prosecutor time to check the validity of the
alibi before the trial and prepare a defense to it. If the alibi is found to be true, then the
indictment might be dismissed on the prosecutor's own motion and save the accused the
publicity and disgrace of a criminal trial. Cf. Train, His Honor, The Jedge, SATURDAY
EVENING PosT, March 29, 1941, p. 24.
4. People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212, 292 N. Y. Supp. 612 (Co. Ct. 1936); People v
Wright, 172 Misc. 860, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 593 (Co. Ct. 1940); People v. Rakiec, 260 App.
Div. 452, 23 N. Y. S. (2td) 607 (3d Dep't 1940).
5. MIcEr. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1936) §§ 17313, 17314 (enacted 1927).
6. Oro GEN'. CODE AsN. (Page Perm. Supp. 1935) § 13444.20 (enacted 1929).
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to require advance notice of alibi. In the former, three cases have mentioned the
statute with approval and impliedly recognized its validity.8 The Ohio Supreme Court
has directly passed upon its own statute and upheld its constitutionality. 9 Recently,
the courts of Kansas 10 and Utah"1 have approved of the respective alibi laws in their
states and declared them to be constitutional.
The instant case makes no reference to the constitutionality of the New York
statute other than by citing People v. Schade.12 In approving of the statute, no prior
New York case had drawn the distinction between testimony offered by a defense
3
witness and defendant's personal testimony.'
The pertinent constitutional section providing that a defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself 14 has been reasonably interpreted and has resulted
in forcing a person to stand for identification,' 5 to be fingerprinted, 16 to have his
clothes compared with marks near the crime, 17 and to allow articles removed from
7. A similar law has been on the statute books of Scotland for more than twenty years.
5 Ency. Laws of Scot. 239. There is no statutory provision in England, but in Rex v.

Littleboy [1934] 2 K. B. 408, the court upheld the trial judge's unfavorable comments
on the fact that the defendant had not raised the defense of alibi before the trial and
'allowing the jury to draw an unfavorable inference from that fact.
8. People v. Marcus, 253 Mich. 410, 235 N. W. 202 (1931); People v. Wudarski, 253
Mich. 83, 234 N. W. 157 (1931). Both cases turned on the question as to whether a charge

that an "alibi is hard to, disprove" was error. It was held that even after the passing of
the alibi statute, such statement was not error. See also People v. Miller, 250 Mich. 72,
229 N. W. 475 (1930).
9. State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 176 N. E. 656 (1931); State v. Nooks, 123 Ohio St.
190, 174 N. E. 743 (1930).
10. State v. Carter, 149 Kan. 295, 87 P. (2d) 818, 820 (1939); State v. Woolworth,
148 Kan. 180, 189, 81 P. (2d) 43, 48 (1938); State v. Rafferty, 145 Kan. 795, 800, 67 P.
(2d)

1111, 1115

(1937).

All mention

with approval KAx. GEN.

STAT. A N.

(Corrick,

1935) § 62-1341.
11. State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 301, 67 P. (2d) 647, 651 (1937). This, case was decided under Utah Laws, 1935 c. 120.
12. 161 Misc. 212, 292 N. Y. Supp. 612 (Co. Ct. 1936). This was on a motion by
defendant to set aside the district attorney's demand for a bill of particulars as to an alibi,
on the grounds that it was unconstitutional, in compelling the defendant to be a witness
against himself. The court upheld the validity of the statute saying that there is no compulsion, but simply a procedure whereby a defendant may plead an alibi for his own
benefit. N. Y. CONST. Art. I, § 6 was not violated.
A 'more recent case impliedly holds the statute constitutional. People v. Wright, 172
Misc. 860, 861, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 593, 594 (Co. Ct. 1940).
13. See People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212, 217, 292 N. Y. Supp. 612, 618 (Co. Ct. 1936),
where the court said" . . . we will no longer have the spectacle of a defendant suddenly
and brazenly flaunting a manufactured alibi in the face of the court and jury." See also
note 12 supra.
14. N. Y. CoNsr. Art. I, § 6.
15. People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, 38 N. E. 1003 (1894).
16. People v. Sallow, 100 Misc. 447, 165 N. Y. Supp. 915 (Gen. Sess. 1917).
17. People v. Van Wormer, 175 N. Y. 188, 67 N. E. 299 (1903).
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his person to be introduced into evidence.' 8 These and other procedural devices have
been allowed 19 on the grounds that they do not compel testimony. The constitution
applies only to the compulsion of testimony. The statute does not compel disclosing
an alibi or any testimony at all. The defendant must freely choose to offer such evidence for his own defense before the statute applies.2 0 Under this act it appears
that the element of compulsion is eliminated and so the constitution is not violated.
The primary effect of this statute is that the tim6 when the prosecuting attorney
learns of this defense, is moved forward from the trial to the pleading stage where
a more thorough analysis may be had. Even after the defendant gives the bill of
particulars, he need not offer any alibi evidence and the prosecutor cannot comment
on it. The same result would follow by granting an adjournment 2l of the trial, after
similar testimony was introduced, and such procedure is permitted. The statute
merely sets up a reasonable rule of pleading, and as such could be constitutional
when applied to either the defendant or his witnesses.
The majority opinion is based solely on the reasoning that this statute, if applied
to the defendant, would deny him the right to testify in his own behalf in any
criminal case.22 This is not a constitutional right,23 but a statutory privilege, in
derogation of the common law which denied a defendant the right to testify. 24
Prior to its enactment in 1869, the common law rule prevailed in New York.25 Since
the legislature gave to the accused the absolute right to testify, it can modify or even
abolish it, as long as no constitutional right is violated. The "Alibi Statute" merely
places a reasonable condition on the privilege of testifying as to alibi evidence. In
fact, in the court's discretion, alibi evidence may be admitted without any advance
notice. 26
18. People v. Chiagles, 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. E. 583 (1923). The constitutional provision -was intended as a shield to protect innocently accused persons, and not as a sword
to sanction perjury. Schmidt v. District Attorney of Monroe County, 255 App. Div. 353,
8 N. Y. S. (2d) 787 (3d Dep't 1938).
20. N. Y. CODE Cam..PRoc. § 295 1.
21. Walker v. State, 116 Ga. 537, 42 S.E. 787 (1902).
22. N. Y. CODE CIU. PROC. § 393.
23. A change iaerely in procedure does not violate the due process clause of the Federal
Constitution. Hurtado v. People, 110 U. S.516 (1884). This is true in the present case
since at common law there was no right given to an accused to testify in his own behalf.
In Smetana v. State, 22 Ohio L. Abst. 165 (1935), in referring to the Ohio Alibi Statute

the court says that the right of an accused to testify in his own behalf is not a constitutional
right but is one given by statute, and the legislature may regulate and limit it, and has
enacted this section under that authority.
24. WHARTON, EvDENCE nr Cnn rAL CAsEs (11th ed. 1935) § 1207. Brown v. United
States, 56 F. (2d) 997, 999 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); State v. Laffer, 38 Iowa 422 (1874);
Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St. 481, 482, 140 N. E. 364, 365 (1922).
25. See People ex rel. Woronoff v. Mallon, 222 N. Y. 456, 119 N. E. 102 (1918); People
v. Courtney, 94 N. Y. 490 (1884), saying that N. Y. CODE CRn. PROC. § 393 changed the
existing common law which did not allow a defendant the right to testify in his own behalf.
When the states were formed after the Revolution they adopted the then existing English

common law.
26. " ... the court may exclude such testimony . . . . and

"

. . .

In the event that

the court shall, allow such testimony (without notice) ...it must, upon motion of the
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The wording of the statute itself, as the dissenting judge points out, 27 is general
and does not distinguish between the defendant and other witnesses. It reads: "Unless
the defendant shall ...serve and file such bill of particulars, the court in the event
that such testimony (of alibi) is sought to be interposed by the defendant ...or in
the event that a witness not mentioned ...

is called ...

may exclude such testimony

or the testimony of such witness.... ",28 If the defendant's testimony was intended
to be exempt from the statute one would expect that it would be expressly made so.
The court finds authority for its decision in State v. Thayer.29 That case upheld
the constitutionality of a similar Ohio Statute30 and is also relied on in the first
New York case on this subject. 31 It is submitted however that the court based its
reasoning on a case not in point, whereas they could have relied on one whose facts
32
were similar to the principal case.
The majority decision, in reading in an exemption clause, has deprived the statute
of its potency 33 and controverted the legislative intent. 34 There is no deprivation of
prosecuting attorney grant an adjournment ...." N. Y. CODE CRMn. PROc. § 295 1.
The burden of disproving the alibi is still on the state and so this section cannot be said
to relieve the district attorney of his obligation to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. N. Y. CODE Cims. PRoc. § 389.
27. People v. Rakiec, 260 App. Div. 452, 459; 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 607, 613 (3d Dep't
1940).
28. N. Y. CODE CRar. PROC. § 295 1. (Italics supplied.)
29. 124 Ohio St. 1, 176 N. E. 656 (1931).
30. Omo GEN. CODE ANN. (Page Perm. Supp. 1935) § 13444.20.
31. People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212, 217, 292 N. Y. Supp. 612, 618 (Co. Ct. 1936).
When mentioning the Ohio case, this court relates to the facts as: "In Ohio, a defendant
whose alibi testimony has been excluded . . . was convicted." It seems that in approving
of that case the court considered it as applying to tho exclusion of defendant's testimony.
32. A few months before State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 176 N. E. 656 (1931) was
decided, the case of State v. Nooks, 123 Ohio St. 190, 174 N. E. 743 (1930), reached the
Supreme Court of Ohio. One of the two defendants jointly tried for larceny, offered alibi
evidence without compliance with the statute. His testimony also tended to disprove the
state's principal witness. The court held that his testimony may be excluded for failure to
satisfy the statute and that such exclusion did not deny the defendant a fair trial. This
was the sole issue on the appeal of the case. In the Thayer case the reference to the alibi
statute was the lesser of two points. If the interpretation given to the Thayer case by the
New York Court is correct it overrules the Nooks case, and yet no mention of that case
was made in the Thayer case. It is therefore submitted that since the Ohio court in the
Thayer case did not expressly say that the statute does not apply to the defendant, it
merely approved of the trial judge's use of his discretion under the Ohio statute which
allows him to receive alibi testimony without compliance with the provisions of the law.
The New York statute, as has been pointed out, is also discretionary.
33. The statute aims to prevent surprise and perjured testimony regardless of who
offers it. By allowing thekdefendant absolute freedom in testifying, he may do away with
witnesses and offer the alibi himself, and all abuses which were to be eliminated by the
statute would recur. This would be especially :true where there are several defendants and
each acts as a witness for himself and the others.
34. "Its (the alibi statute) purpose clearly is to erect safeguards against wrongful use
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As the minority judge states,
a substantial right, but merely a procedural change.
35
the courts should "accept the law as written."

ILLEGAL CONTRACT-RIGHT OF ESTATE TO RECOVER FROM A THIRD PARTY ASSIGNEE,
PROPERTY GIVEN BY THE INTESTATE.--The intestate concealed his identity as true
owner of stock in a brewery corporation from public authorities, by having it issued
to another as his dummy and agent, in order to obtain an operating permit, which
would not have otherwise been issued. An action was brought by the intestate's
administratrix, to recover for conversion of the stock and additional damages for
inducing the corporation to breach its contract, against the agent's assignee of the
property. On appeal from an order striking out a defense, ield, three judges dissenting, the intestate having perpetrated a fraud in the original acquisition of the stock,
his administratrix has no right to pursue it or recover for its conversion, on the
ground of "public policy". Flegenheitner v. Brogan, 284 N. Y. 268, 30 N. E. (2d)
591 (1940).
The contract made by the intestate with the defendant's vendor was intended to
contravene the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law,' which requires in effect, that the
true situation and relation of all parties interested in the business covered by the
license be disclosed, otherwise the license must be revoked, and the parties falsifying
purpose the violation
are guilty of a misdemeanor. A contract having for its prime
2
of a statute is illegal and void as contrary to public policy.
It is a general rule that where the parties are in pari delicto, property delivered
under an illegal contract, which has been executed, cannot generally be recovered
back.3 In all such cases the defendant's possession is a sufficient answer to the
plaintiff's demand, because such possession stands as the equivalent of a title,4 and
of the defense of alibi and give the prosecution time and information to investigate the
merit of such defense." State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 301, 67 P. (2d) 647, 651 (1937).
35. People v. Rakiec, 260 App. Div. 452, 460, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 607, 614 (3d Dep't 1940).
1. Consol. Laws, c. 3-B, §§ 110, 111, 118 (2), 130.
2. California Delta Farms Inc. v. Chinese American Farms Inc., 207 Cal. 298, 278 Pac.
227 (1929); Frank H. Zindle Inc. v. Friedman's Express Inc., 258 App. Div. 636, 17 N. Y.
S. (2d) 594 (1st Dep't 1940); Minton v. D. A. Schulte, Inc., 153 Misc. 195, 274 N. Y.
Supp. 641 (Sup. Ct. 1934).

3. E turpi causa norz oritur actia (out of an illegal consideration an action cannot
arise). Potior est conditio possidentis (the possessor is in the better position). Second
Russian Insurance Co. v. Miller, 268 U. S. 552 (1925); Union Exchange National Bank
v. Joseph, 231 N. Y. 250, 131 N. E. 905 (1921); Perkins v. Savage, 15 Wend. 412 (N. Y.

1836); New Century Mfg. Co. v. Scfieurer, 45 S. W. (2d) 560 (Texas, 1932). An exception to these general rules can be found in N. Y. Penal Law §§ 994, 995, allowing property
staked for gambling purposes to be recovered back.
However, if the illegal part of the contract is executory, goods which have been delivered over may be reclaimed, because there is a locus poenitentiae (an opportunity to withdraw before consummation of the illegal part). Darling v. Darling, 241 App. Div. 57, 270
N. Y. Supp. 557 (4th Dep't 1934) aff'd 265 N. Y. 650, 193 N. E. 428 (1934).
4. 6 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1938) 5079: ". . ; even though the buyer is held

to acquire no title, the seller on account of his illegality is precluded from attacking the
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to discourage such transactions, courts will be deaf to the plea of a party in pari
delicto. This is no anomaly however. The defendant is not relying on the fraud.
plaintiff is to recover'on
He is not using the illegal transaction as a defense.5 ' "The
6
his own merits, not on the demerits of the defendant.
The dissenting opinion written by Judge Finch maintains that since the suit is
brought in conversion, not against Vogel, the dummy, but against Brogan, the assignee,
which to his mind makes it unnecessary for the plaintiff to rely on the illegal contract, the plaintiff should recover. In the cases cited 7 by Judge Finch in support, the
property in question had been obtained legally by the plaintiffs and thereafter made
the subject of an illegal contract. In them, the plaintiffs could show title without
adverting to any illegal transaction. In the case at bar, the first acquisition by the
plaintiff of the property was tainted with illegality. Hence the illegal transaction
seems essential to the plaintiff's claim for he must show a title or right to the property8 since the defendant was in possession. This can only be done by showing the
contract between the intestate and the defendant's assignor. For that reason also
it seems impossible to put the plaintiff's claim on an equitable ground, because she
lacks the qualification which is demanded of those who come into a court of equity.
A seeming difficulty with the result is the fact that the wife, who, courts in all
cases seek to protect, is made to suffer. It is well to bear in mind that the wife is
suing as administratrix, and *as such, has lost her protected personality. The powers
of executors and administrators are derivative. The deceased's representatives have
no greater rights than he would have, if living. 9 The plaintiff stands in the intestate's
shoes. She is the "eadem persona of the intestate". 10
The plaintiff's position as a distributee does not protect her. A distributee cannot
set aside a fraudulent conveyance. It is only void as against creditors. Neither the
grantor nor his distributees claiming under him can avail themselves of any fraud,
to which the grantor was a party, to defeat any conveyance made by him. The
intention of the law in establishing this principle is effectually to prevent frauds, by
conveyance, and if no other person has a claim to the goods or other property conveyed,
the buyer's possession necessarily remains undisturbed."
S. Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 343, 98 Eng. Reprints 1120, 1121 (1775). Lord
Mansfield said: "It is not for his (defendant) sake, however, that the objection is ever
allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the
advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff, by accident,
if I may say so."
6.

Farmer v. Russell, 1 B. & P. 296, 300, 126 Eng. Reprints 913, 915 (1798).

7. Hall v. Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251, 9 Am. Rep. 30 (1871); Pelosi v. Bugbee, 217 Mass.
579, 105 N. E. 222 (1914); Robertson v. Sayre, 134 N. Y. 97, 30 Am. St. Rep. 627 (1892).

8. Granade v. United States Lbr. Co., 224 Ala. 185, 139 So. 409 (1932); Dorris v.
San Luis Valley Finance Co., 90 Colo. 209, 7 P. (2d) 407 (1932); Fulton v. Fulton, 48
Barb. 581 (N. Y. 1866).
9. Citizen's Bank v. Moore, 134 Ark. 554, 204 S. W. 619 (1918); Goodhue v. State
Street Trust Co., 267 Mass. 28, 165 N. E. 701 (1929); Robertson v. Sayre, 134 N. Y. 97,
31 N. E. 250 (1892). Contra: Finnegan v. La Fontaine, 122 Conn. 561, 191 AtI. 337
(1937), (1938) 22 Mnm. L. Rxv. 429, holding that heirs and distributees are innocent
successors to the beneficial interest which the deceased grantor retained but could not
enforce.
10. Matter of Martin, 82 Misc. 574, 144 N. Y. Supp. 174 (Surr. Ct. 1913).
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refusing to relieve any man or his heirs or distributees from the consequences of
his own fraudulent act. 1
The most important question in the case is whether the subsequent assignment
of the property to the defendant is tainted by the original illegal consideration, in
such a way as to perpetuate the fraud. In McBlair v. Gibbes' 2 the contention, that
the original contract being illegal, the sale and assignment of an interest therein to
the assignee was also illegal, was dismissed in no uncertain terms. Mr. justice Nelson
states: "But this position is not maintainable. The transaction, . .. was unaffected
with any illegality. . . The assignment was subsequent, collateral to, and wholly
independent of, the illegal transactions upon which the principal contract was
14
founded."' 3 The subsequent contract is not contaminated by the original illegality.
If the plaintiff could not recover against the defendant's assignor, and through the
mechanics of a valid assignment the defendant succeeded to his assignor's rights,
then the plaintiff cannot recover against the defendant.
Several cases have been decided holding that money or property deposited with a
third person, which was derived from or through an unlawful enterprise, may be
recovered; and that the illegality of the transaction, out of which the money or
property arose, cannot be successfully asserted as a defense by the depository.' 5
That rule is well settled but it is not germane to this case. The theory of recovery
in these cases is that the money had been received by the depository for the use of
the plaintiff. This created a promise in law to repay. The collateral promise can be
enforced without adverting to the original consideration. Here, however, the defendant is a purchaser and not a depository. Observing the principle that the law
will not lend itself to a claim founded upon its violation, and taking into consideration the separate valid assignment, there seems ample argument for the court's
decision. 16
INTEREST-SMALL LoAN ACT-RENEWAL NOTMS.-One Radner, a bankrupt, was
indebted to respondent loan company in the sum of $158.19, representing principal
and interest due on a note. The respondent made a new loan to the bankrupt in
the sum of $287, with interest at the maximum legal rate, the proceeds of which
11. Sifford v. Cutler, 244 Ill. 234, 91 N. E. 428 (1910); Fox v. Whitney, 16 Mass. 118
(1819); Drinkwater v. Drinkwater, 4 Mass. 354 (1808); Hayes v. Fry, 110 Mo. App. 20,
83 S. W. 772 (1904); Garfield v. Hatmaker, 15 N. Y. 475 (1857).
12. 17 How. 232 (U. S. 1854).
13. McBlair v. Gibbes, 17 How. 232, 235 (U. S. 1854).
14. Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258, 271 (U. S. 1826). It is to be noted that both
McBlain v. Gibbes and Armstrong v. Toler were approved in McMullen v. Hoffman, 174
U. S.639 (1899).
15. Planters Bank v. Union Bank, 16 Wall. 483 (U. S. 1872); Farmer v. Russell, 1 B.
& P. 296, 126 Eng. Reprints 913 (1798); Tenant v. Elliot, 1 B. & P. 3, 126 Eng. Reprints
744 (1797).
16. Here rescission of the contract and return of the money would have the same effect
as enforcement of the illegal contract. This would achieve the anomalous result of a
court completing the desired result of a contract declared void on the ground of public
policy. Van Schaick v. Manhattan Savings Institution, 273 N. Y. 37, 6 N. E. (2d) 88
(1936); Norwalk v. Marcus, 235 App. Div. 211, 256 N. Y. Supp. 697 (1st Dep't 1932),
aff'd 261 N. Y. 615, 185 N. E. 761 (1933).
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were divided. One check, for $159.29, was endorsed back to the loan company in
satisfaction of the old loan and the other, for $127.71, was turned over to the
bankrupt. The notes were secured by a chattel mortgage on the bankrupt's automobile and household furniture. The second note having matured, the referee in
bankruptcy ordered delivery of the bankrupt's automobile to the respondent, as
chattel mortgagee. On petition to review this order, held, the principal of the second
loan included interest on the prior loan and thus the transaction is void as a contract in violation of the statutory prohibitibn against the compounding of interest.
Order of referee reversed. Matter of Radner, 36 F. Supp. 964 (S.D. N. Y. 1941).
In 1932 New York enacted the so-called Small Loan Act providing for the licensing
of personal finance companies and the regulation of their loan transactions. 1 By its
terms all prior legislation regulating small loans is repealed 2 and the high interest
charges permitted on small loans can be made only by licensees under the act. Loans
are limited to $300; interest may be charged up to 3% per month on the first $150
of principal and 22% per month on the balance in excess of $150.3
Prior to the passage of this regulatory legislation, the small loan business had
been conducted with very little supervision. People in the lower income brackets,
when confronted with an emergency requiring ready cash, could not place a loan
with one of the commercial banks-collateral and credit requirements were too high.
The only solution, if the need was urgent, was the beneficence of the "loan shark".
It was thought that the provisions of the Small Loan Act would encourage responsible
capital to enter the small loan field, thus eliminating the undesirable, usurious element by competition. 4 Because of the unusually high interest rates permitted under
the Act and the resultant necessity for protecting the borrower, usually a person
without much business acumen, many safeguards were written into the Act. One of
the most important was the provision forbidding the compounding of interest.5
Compound interest is a term susceptible of two meanings. The first meaning of
the term is seen in contracts where it is agreed that interest shall be computed by the
establishment of periodical "rests", or dates on which interest instalments are pay1. N. Y. BANKING LAW, Art. IX. Similar statutes have been enacted in many states.
FLA. Comp. GEN. LAWS ANr. (Skillman, 1927) §§ 3999-4017; GA. CODE ANN. (Park et al.,
1933) §§ 25 (301-319); ILL. REv. STAT. (Bar Ass'n Ed., 1939) Ch. 74, §§ 19-46; IND. STAT.
ANN. (Burns, 1933) tit. 18, c. 30; IOWA CODE (Whitney, 1935) Ch. 419; Ky. STAT. ANN.
(Carroll, 1936) §§ 883i (1-32); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. (Dart, 1932) §§ 768-787; MIcH. CoMp.
LAWS (1927) §§ 12198-12224; Omo GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1926) § 6346; PA. STAT.
(Purdon, 1936) tit. 7, §§ 751-760; W. VA. OCrAL CODE ANN. (1931) c. 47, art. 7, §§ 1-21.
2. Laws of 1915, c. 588, Art. IX, §§ 340-373, as amended by Laws of 1920, c. 703, p.
1750, as amended by Laws of 1930, c. 243, p. 613 and c. 281, p. 662, were repealed.
3. N. Y. BANKING LAW § 352. Two bills reducing the maximum interest rates under
this section were passed at the recent session of the Legislature and are awaiting action
by the Governor. N. Y. Sen. Int. 405 (1941); N. Y. Ass. Int. 2234 (1941).
4. See Hilborn, The Small Loan Act (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 581 fdr a discussion of the
Uniform Small Loan Law, the basis of most of the state legislation in this field. That
the Small Loan Act has not completely cured the "loan shark" evil in New York is shown
by the report of the Conference on Personal Finance Law. BNmrr AND H=rNmx, TnE
CAmAIOGN AGAIN ST AUTO LOAN UsURERs IN NEW YORK STATE (1940). See also London
Realty Co. v. Riordan, 207 N. Y. 264, 268, 100 N. E. 800, 802 (1913).
5.

N.

Y. BANKING LAW § 352.
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able. At each "rest", the principal balance and interest accrued thereon are combined into a new6 principal balance on which interest is computed until the next
"rest" and so on. The other-meaning of the term contemplates simple interest on
7
accrued interest, regardless of other circumstances. It refers to situations where
In consideration of the
interest.
accrued
and
principal
as
to
a debtor is in default
creditor's forbearance, the debtor gives a new obligation, the principal of which
includes both principal and interest of the old debt. The first type of computation
is agreed on before the interest which is to bear interest has accrued; in the latter
the interest has accrued and is presently owing when the agreement is made.
The instant case involves the latter method of computation, simple interest on
accrued interest. The question in the case is whether or not the term "compound
interest" as used in the statute should be understood to embrace this method and
thus void the transaction in suit. The law has never favored compound interest, as
a general rule. Some jurisdictions will not enforce contracts to pay interest on
8
interest made in advance, or before the interest has accrued. Others have enforced
are, in effect, an
agreements
such
that
them, being unimpressed by the argument
9
inequitable and unconscionable extortion. It seems that the weight of authority
holds that where interest has become due, it may, by agreement of the parties after
0
its accrual, become principal and itself bear interest.' The rule seems logical and
sound. Interest due and payable is nothing more than a *debt. The debtor should
not complain about nor the creditor be prevented from exacting compensation for
the creditor's forbearance. In the instant case, there was such an agreement between
6. A familiar example of this is the practice followed by banks in computing interest
on savings accounts.
7. Unfortunately the term "compound interest" has been used loosely. See Young v.
Hill, 67 N. Y. 162 (1876). A few courts have distinguished the two meanings, however.
American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 26 F. Supp. 954
(S. D. N. Y. 1939), wherein the court said: "Compounding interest is the adding of

accumulated interest to the principal at periodic intervals. An agreement to pay simple
interest on an overdue instalment of interest is different." Rouse v. Jennings, 263 Mich.
609, 249 N. W. 10 (1933); Morgan v. Mortgage Discount Co., 100 Fla. 124, 129 So. 589
(1930)

(a promissory note with interest at 8% per annum payable semi-annually con-

tained a clause providing that deferred interest payments should bear interest from
maturity at the rate of 8% per annum, also payable semi-annually, held, this agreement
differed from "an agreement to pay compound interest where periodically the accrued inter-

est is added to the principal and interest is computed on the new principal thus formed",
and note is valid); Bledsoe v. Nixon, 69 N. C. 89, 12 Am. Rep. 642 (1873).
8. Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162 (1876); Newburger-Morris Co. v. Talcott, 219 N. Y.
505, 114 N. E. 846 (1916); Lemnos Broad Silk Works, Inc. v. Spiegelberg, 127 Misc. 855,
217 N. Y. Supp. 595 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
9. Burke v. Trabue, 137 Ky. 580, 126 S. W. 125 (1910); Angel v. Miller, 90 Tex. 505,
39 S. W. 916 (1897); Matter of Diven, 115 Kan. 119, 222 Pac. 106 (1924); Byrd v. Prudential Ins. Co., 185 Ga. 625, 196 S. E. 72 (1938).
10. Musser v. Murphy, 49 Idaho 141, 286 Pac. 618 (1930); Cram & Sons v. Central
Trust Co., 205 Iowa 408, 216 N. W. 71 (1927). Both these cases involved renewal notes
which included principal and interest due on a prior obligation. Wigton v. Elliott, 49 Colo.
115, 111 Pac. 713 (1910); Rouse v. Jennings, 263 Mich. 609, 249 N. W. 10 (1933); Young
v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162 (1876).
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the parties, viz. the renewal note which included both principal and interest of the
former debt.
The statute involved herein, being in derogation of the common law, should be
strictly construed." If the term "compound interest" had been strictly construed
herein, the result would be contra to that reached by the court; it would have been
held that the "compound interest" barred by the statute was that which accumulates
automatically, at stated periods, by agreement of the parties made in advance.
It is pointed out by the court that to allow transactions of the type in issue would
be to defeat the purpose for which the statute was enacted, i.e., "to prevent the
charge of excessive interest to impecunious borrowers, who otherwise would fall
into the hands of the unscrupulous."' 2 It is submitted that the court's interpretation of the term "compound interest" in the instant case, with the resultant voiding
of many loan transactions entered into in good faith, might itself defeat the purpose of the Act. If renewals of loans, in accordance with customary business practice of responsible companies, are barred, an "impecunious" borrower might well be
driven back to the "loan shark" to avoid, at least for the time being, the loss of his
mortgaged car or furniture.
The court takes the view that the transaction herein was not a separate contract.
While it is true that the satisfaction of the old obligation is compelled by the loan
company as a condition of the new loan, there is additional credit extended; the second loan is more than "merely a renewal". Suppose the borrower places the new
loan with another company, possibly a subsidiary of the original lender; he still pays
interest on interest. The distinction rests partly on the time element in the transaction and is very finely drawn. As a practical matter, the time element would seem
to be immaterial-there is no difference in principle.
In view of the importance of the small loan problem, especially in large cities like
New York, it would be well for the legislature to reconsider this statute with a view
to its clarification. It is always difficult to decide cases which turn on fine points of
legislative intent; the problem of the instant case could be resolved by inserting in
of "compound interest", a term that has often been troublethe statute a definition
13
some in the past.
11. Bickart v. Sanditz, 105 Conn. 766, 136 Atl. 580 (1927); Decker v. Goddard, 233
App. Div. 139, 251 N. Y. Supp. 440 (4th Dep't 1931), rev'g, 139 Misc. 824, 249 N. Y.
Supp. 381 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Candler v. Smith, 50 Ga. App. 667, 179 S. E. 395 (1935) (construction conforming to the common law rule rather than one in derogation thereof should
App. 438 (1934) ; Liberty
be adopted). But see Winnick v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 275 Ill.
Finance Co. v. Catterton, 161 Md. 650, 158 Atl. 16 (1932); Cash Service Co. v. Ward, 118
W. Va. 703, 192 S. E. 344 (1937), holding that the Small Loan Law, as remedial legislation, should be construed liberally in favor of those for whose benefit it was enacted.
12. Matter of Radner, 36 F. Supp. 964, 966 (S.D. N. Y. 1941). Georgia and Pennsylvania courts have so decided under similar statutes. Frazier v. City Investment Co., 42 Ga.
App. 585, 157 S. E. 102 (1930) ; Lanier v. Consolidated Loan & Finance Co., 47 Ga. App.
148, 170 S. E. 99 (1933); Commonwealth v. State Loan Corp., 116 Pa. Super. 365, 176

AtI. 516 (1935).
13. It should be noted that the construction of the statute herein will not be binding
on the New York courts. People ex rel. Weber & Heilbroner, Inc. v. Graves, 249 App. Div.
49, 291 N. Y. Supp. 354 (3d Dep't 1936); Marsich v. Eastman Kodak Co., 244 App. Div.
295, 279 N. Y. Supp. 140 (2d Dep't 1935), aff'd without opinion, 269 N. Y. 621, 200 N. E.
27 (1936).
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MORTGAGES-DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT-RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF CIVIL PRACTICE ACT

§ 1083.-Plaintiff foreclosed a real property mortgage executed by the defendant's
testator in December, 1932, becoming the purchaser at the sale. A deficiency judgment, entered against the defendant for the difference between the mortgage debt
and the sale price, was vacated by the Appellate Division under Section 1083 of the
Civil Practice Act, as amended April 7, 1938, providing that in an action to foreclose
a mortgage the amount of the deficiency judgment is to be fixed by deducting from
the mortgage debt the market value of the property as determined by the court
or the sale price, whichever is the higher. On appeal, held, one judge dissenting, the
1938 amendment to Section 1083 of the Civil Practice Act whien applied retroactively
is unconstitutional as impairing the obligations of a contract and defendant is liable
for the difference between the mortgage debt and the sale price. National City Bank
of New York v. Gelfert, 284 N. Y. 13, 29 N. E. (2d) 449 (1940).
Originally, a mortgagee of real property could not obtain a deficiency judgment in
1
a foreclosure action, but had to bring a separate action at law therefor. Later, in
two
actions. 2
most jurisdictions statutes were passed doing away with the necessity of
In New York, the statute provided that in a single equity action to foreclose a
mortgage, a personal judgment for the deficiency would be entered for the difference
between the mortgage debt and the sale price.3 This statute was in effect when the
4
mortgage in the principal case was executed. A subsequent amendment changed this
method of computing the deficiency judgment and required in effect that the mortgagee must on foreclosure bid in the property at a price that shall at least equal the
market value since he can receive only the difference between the said value and the
mortgage debt. This later amendment is held inapplicable to the mortgage in question.
Since the laws in effect at the time and place of the making of a contract enter
into and form part of the contract as fully as if they had been expressly referred to
or incorporated in its terms, 5 the present decision would seem to be correct, and the
holding that later amendments may not be retroactively applied is supportable. But
at least some doubt is created by the fact that the standard for determining the
amount of the deficiency provided for by the new Section 1083 is exactly the same
as that set up by the emergency mortgage legislation of 1936,6 and that legislation
7
has been held constitutional although retroactively applied.
1. Dunldey v. Van Buren, 3 Johns. Ch. 330 (N. Y. 1818).
2. In general once a court of equity obtains jurisdiction of an action, it retains it and
administers full relief, both legal and equitable so far as it pertains to the same transaction. There seems to have been no reason for the exception to the general rule in the case
of mortgage foreclosures and legislatures took early occasion to change the law. Frank v.
Davis, 135 N. Y. 275, 277, 31 N. E. 1100, 1101 (1892). See also WALsH, MoRTGAGES (1934)
§ 77.
3. Former Section 1083, N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Aer.
4. The market value is to be determined by the court. N. Y. Crv. PRAC. Acr § 1083
(1938).
5. "To know the obligations of a contract we look to the laws in force at its making."
Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56, 60 (1935). Farmer's Bank v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 262 U. S. 649, 660 (1923).
6. N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 794.
7. Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 539 (1939); Honeyman v. Clark, 278 N. Y. 467, 17 N.
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It might be said that the retroactive application of the legislation of 1933 was justified ,only on the ground that it was emergency legislation and that such justification
is lacking for the statute in question. Some warrant for this appears in earlier
cases. The constitutionality of much of the emergency legislation of the past few
s
years is based on the famous case of Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell.
In that case the United States Supreme Court upheld the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law providing that a mortgagor might obtain an extension of time to pay
the principal by applying to the state courts. The opinion stressed the fact that it
was properly within the police power of the state to impair the obligation of contracts during an emergency,9 and the Court relied in part upon the earlier decisions
upholding the Emergency Rent Laws. 10 Following this decision the police power of
the state in an emergency was frequently invoked in order to hold such statutes con12
was
stitutional." 1 In New York, when the Civil Practice Act Section 1083(a)
upheld by the New York courts, specific stress was laid on the fact that it was
emergency legislation and limited in its duration.15 This statute had set up exactly
the same procedure for determining the amount of the deficiency as was set up by
the present statute. But it applied only to mortgages executed before July 1, 1932,14
and it was limited to the period of the emergency. 15
E. (2d) 131 (1938); Honeyman v. Hanan, 275 N. Y. 382, 9 N. E. (2d) 970 (1937); Klinke
v. Samuels, 264 N. Y. 144, 190 N. E. 324 (1934).

8. Home Bldg. & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934), Comment (1935)
L. REv. 73. For a good history of moratory legislation see Feller, Moratory
4 Fosum
Legislation (1933) 46 HAgv. L. Rxv. 1061.
9. "Not only is the constitutional provision qualified by the measure of control which
the State retains over remedial processes, but the State also continues to possess authority
to safeguard the vital interests of its people. It does not matter that legislation appropriate
to that end 'has the result of modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect'. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 276. Not only are existing laws read into contracts in'order
to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order." Home Bldg.
& Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 434 (1934).
10. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegal, 258 U. S. 242 (1922); Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman,
256 U. S. 170 (1921); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921).
11.

Russel v. Battle Creek Lumber Co., 265 Mich. 649, 252 N. W. 561 (1934); Lingo

Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 64 S. W. (2d) 835 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Des Moines Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Nordholm, 217 Iowa 1319, 253 N. W. 701 (1934).
12. N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 794.
13. In Klinke v. Samuels, 264 N. Y. 144, 190 N. E. 324 (1934), the court emphasized
that the limitation upon the remedy was until July 1, 1934, and that thereafter all the
remedies, so far as the present laws applied, would be open to mortgage creditors. See also
note 7 supra.
14. The theory evidently was to give relief to mortgagors who had entered into mortgage contracts during the boom years. Mortgagors entering into contracts after July 1, 1932,
would have ample means to protect themselves.
15. Since this was emergency legislation, it could not be enacted for a period longer
than the emergency. If the statute had been passed for a period of 8 or 10 years, it might
have been declared unconstitutional since no one could predict how long the emergency
would last. Therefore the legislature passed the statute for a period of one year and it
has since reenacted it every year.
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However, in later cases the emergency character of legislation on mortgage matters
is not emphasized. Thus, when the New York statute came before the United States
Supreme Court and was upheld in Honeyman v. Jacobs,1 6 no reference was made
in the decision to the emergency character of the legislation. Rather, the Court pointed
out that a mortgage contract contemplates that the mortgagee make himself whole
out 6f the security; that there is no principle which entitled him to receive any
more; 17 that the new procedure was consistent with the inherent power of a court
of equity over foreclosure sales and deficiency judgments.18 The Court referred to
the case of Richmond Mortgage Corp. v. Wachovia Bank"9 and held that the reasoning of that case was applicable. That case involved a North Carolina statute, providing that when the holder of an obligation secured by real estate causes a trustee's
sale of the property, at which such holder becomes the purchaser for less than the
amount of the debt, and thereafter such holder brings an action for a deficiency, the
defendant may show by way of defense and set off, that the property sold was fairly
worth the amount of the debt or that the amount bid was substantially less than the
true value of the property and thereby defeat any deficiency judgment against him
in whole or in part. The Court speaking through Butler, J., said: "The act alters and
modifies one of the existing remedies for realization of the value of the security, but
cannot fairly be said to do more than restrict the mortgagee to that for which he
contracted, namely, payment in full. It recognizes the obligation of his contract and
his right to its full enforcement but limits that right sd as to prevent his obtaining
more than his due." 20
The court in the principal case does not adopt the trend of the United States
Supreme Court. It dismisses the Wachovia Bank case with the observation that the
statute there had no application if the purchaser at the trustee's sale were some one
other than the mortgagee 2l and also that it affected only foreclosures under power of
sale and not sales made pursuant to a decree of the court. But the court makes no
mention of the fact that the Supreme Court has held that the reasoning of the
Wachovia Bank case is "applicable" to the emergency statute setting up exactly the
same procedure as the present permanent statute does. Likewise, the decision in the
principal case does not even mention the fact that the Supreme Court upheld the
16, 306 U. S.539, 543 (1939).
17. "Assuming that the statute before its amendment permitted a recovery of an
additional amount through a so-called deficiency judgment, we cannot say that there was
any constitutional sanction for such a provision which precluded the legislature from
changing it so as to confine the creditor to securing the satisfaction of his entire debt."
Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 539, 543 (1939).
18. "Section 1083-a in substance assured to the court the exercise of its appropriate
equitable powers. By the normal exercise of these powers, a court of equity in a foreclosure
suit would have full authority to fix the terms and time of the foreclosure sale and to
refuse to confirm sales upon the equitable grounds where they were found to be unfair
or the bid price was inadequate." Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U. S.539, 543 (1939).
19.
20.

300 U. S. 124 (1937).
300 U. S. 124, 130 (1937).

21. This argument is not without merit. It seems unjust to force the mortgagee to
credit the mortgagor's debt with the fair value of the property when a third party is the
purchaser at a normal bid. But see the criticism of it in Farage, Mortgage Deficiency Judginent Acts and Their Constitutionality (1937) 41 Dicx. L. REv. 67, 72.
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emergency statute for reasons which, quite significantly, did not follow those of the
New York Court of Appeals, i.e., it was upheld not because it was emergency legislation but because a court of equity has inherent power over actions for deficiency
judgments and has always had the right to refuse to grant such a judgment if the
sale price was so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court.
It is not clear in New York as to just what powers a court of equity has in this
respect. The Appellate Division in Monoghan v. May22 held that the court has
inherent power to place limitations upon the remedies available to a mortgagee in
consonance with the fundamental doctrines of equity. The Court of Appeals by way
of dictum disapproved of this doctrine in Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank v. Van
Bokkelen.2 3 Since this was only dictum the Appellate Division again followed the
Monoghan case in Guaranteed Title & Mortgage Co. v. Scheffres 24 where the court
held that it could not accept "the narrow view that equity courts are impotent and
powerless in a situation that has always been deemed, from time immemorial, to be
peculiarly within equity, power and jurisdiction." The United States Supreme Court
in the Honeyman case approved of and in part relied on the doctrine of the Monoghan
case. If the decision in the principal case can be construed as settling the New
York law contrary
to this doctrine such a position would not be in accord with the
25
general rule.
There is still a further argument that may be made for holding the statute constitutional. It should be remembered that the purpose of the public auction sale is really
to determine the value of the property. In normal times that method of determining
the value is a fairly accurate one. But in abnormal times it is obviously very inaccurate because it is no longer arrived at by agreement between willing but not
necessitous buyers and sellers. The new procedure set up by the present statute
merely changes the method of determining the value of the property. The method it
sets up is just as accurate as the auction sale and it has the additional advantage of
being truly determinative of the value in periods of economic stress as well as in
normal times. It seems to be nothing but a change of remedy. 26
By the decision of the principal case the law as to deficiency judgments in New
York is left in a rather anomalous situation. In so far as all mortgage contracts made
after April 7, 1938, are concerned, the amounts of any deficiency judgments will be
determined by the new procedure. The reason for this is that all contracts are made
with reference to the existing law. 2 7 The same procedure will also be used in
22.

242 App. Div. 64, 65, 273 N. Y. Supp. 475, 478 (2d Dep't 1934).

23.

269 N. Y. 110, 116, 199 N. E. 23, 25 (1935).

Obiter Dicta (1936)

5 FoRITmAr L.

REv. 378.
24. 247 App. Div. 294, 295, 285 N. Y. Supp. 464, 465 (2d Dep't 1936). This case was
reversed by the Court of Appeals but the court made no mention of this doctrine. 275
N. Y. 30, 9 N. E. (2d) 764 (1937).
25. See Federal Title & Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Lowenstein, 113 N. 3. Eq. 200,
166 AtI. 538 (1933); Young v. Weber, 117 N. J. Eq. 242, 175 Atl. 273 (1934), wherein the
cases on this point are collected. See also 3 JolEs, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 2012.
26. When a change is merely one of remedy and not of substance is a difficult question.

"No attempt has been made to fix definitely the line between alterations of the remedy,
which are to be deemed legitimate, and those which, under the form of modifying the
remedy, impair substantial rights. Every case must be determined upon its own circumstances." Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U. S. 535, 553 (1866).
27.

See note 7 supra.
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determining the amounts of deficiency judgments in the case of mortgage contracts
made before July 1, 1932. The reason for this is that they are covered by the
emergency statute. But the amounts of deficiency judgments in the case of mortgage
contracts made between these dates, as in the principal case, will have to be determined by the old procedure, viz., by simply taking the difference between the mortgage debt and the sale price.
This is unfortunate because under the Supreme Court decisions noted above28
there would seem to be no difficulty in holding that the present statute does not
impair the obligations of a contract though applied retroactively.2 9

TORTS-LBEL AND SLANDER-REsTRICTION OF THE REMEDY TO PERSON AT WHOM
THE ASPERSION IS DIRECTED.-Plaintiff's complaint alleges false publication in de-

fendant's newspaper of an article concerning a deceased "Baldy Jack Rose," describing him as a self-confessed murderer who lived in constant fear of underworld
vengeance, and naming plaintiffs as the surviving wife and children. No other reference in the article to plaintiffs is alleged. On appeal from an order of the Appellate
28. In addition, a referee in bankruptcy in a lower federal court case, decided shortly
before the principal case, held the statute constitutional. In re Riverview Products Inc., 34
F. Supp. 483 (W. D. N. Y. 1940). On appeal, the decision was affirmed. In re Riverview
Products Inc., 34 F. Supp. 733 (W. D. N. Y. 1940). The court, quoting extensively from
Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 539 (1939), held that the language of that case was
controlling with reference to the permanent statute.
The lower courts in New York have disagreed on the question of the constitutionality
of Section 1083. See Tompkins County Trust Co. v. Herrick, 171 Misc. 929, 13 N. Y. S.
(2d) 825 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (statute held constitutional). Contra: Home Owners Loan Corp.
v. Margolis, 168 Misc. 945, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 432 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
29. The argument of the dissenting opinion in the principal case is interesting. It interprets the present statute as not providing an exclusive remedy for the mortgagee. The
language of the statute, it argues, affords reason to believe that the mortgagee may still
bring a separate common law action for the debt; and since this remedy substantially coextensive with the remedy afforded by the old procedure is available to the mortgagee, he
is not being deprived of any substantive rights by the new statute. This interpretation,
however, is not free from doubt. It seems hardly likely that the legislature intended to
pass a statute which could be circumvented by merely changing the form of the action.
But even if this interpretation is correct, the argument of the dissent loses much of its
force in view of Section 1078 of the Civil Practice Act which provides that while a foreclosure action is pending or after the plaintiff has received judgment in that action, "no
other action shall be commenced or maintained to recover any part of the mortgage debt,
without leave of the court in which the former action was brought." The constitutionality
of this section has never been questioned. Honeyman v. Hanan, 275 N. Y. 382, 392, 9 N. E.
(2d) 970, 974 (1937). Since leave to bring a second suit is limited to the judicial discretion
of the court, it can hardly be said that this method provides the mortgagee with an equally
effective remedy. See also Honeyman v. Hanan, 302 U. S. 375 (1937), where it was held
that the requirement that the right to a deficiency judgment should be determined in the
foreclosure action as against one who was a party to the action raises no substantial
federal question.
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Division granting a motion to dismiss the libel action,1 held, three judges dissenting,
a libel or slander upon the memory of a deceased person which makes no direct
reflection upon his relatives gives them no cause of action though a loss of social
standing is in consequence suffered by them. Judgment affirmed. Rose v. Daily
Mirror, Inc., 284 N. Y. 335, 31 N. E. (2d) 183 (1940).
The action for defamation is granted to protect one's interest in enjoying a reputation at least.as favorable as is warranted by his character. A publication which has
a tendency to excite the adverse opinion or feelings of others is in fact defamatory.2
It does not follow however that it is always actionable in the courts. Thus, defamation of the memory of the deceased gives rise to no right of action in favor of the
estate of the deceased 3 or of his living relatives, though it seems it excites adverse
feeling against them. The problem, whether it is just to confine recovery to the
person or persons identified as the object of the defamation, 4 arises most frequently
where the defamatory matter is directed at a deceased person and a ?ear relative
brings libel or slander for the reflection upon him. Almost universally the solution
of the courts is to deny a recovery in such case. The first American decision thereon 5
reached that result, and its authority has been buttressed by a large number of cases
which have followed its conclusion. 6
1. Rose v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 259 App. Div. 928, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 315 (2d Dep't 1940),
40 CoL. L. REv. 1267.
2. McCrary v. Post. Pub. Co., 109 Fla. 93, 147 So. 259 (1933); Sydney v. MacFadden
Newspaper Pub. Corp., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209 (1926); SALmOND, ToRTs (9th ed.
1936) 398.
3. The dead man's estate could not recover on the principle that the tort law concerns
itself only with the living. Rose v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 284 N. Y. 335, 337, 31 N. E. (2d)
182 (1940). To the same effect are Skrocki v. Stahl, 14 Cal. App. 1, 110 Pac. 957 (1910);
Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 144 S. W. (2d) 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). Statutory imposition of a criminal penalty for defamation of the dead is now quite common. Armstrong, Nothing But Good of The Dead? (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 229, 232 collects these
statutes.
4. The rule is so stated in HaPER, ToRTs (1933) 499. The decisions uniformly state
that to maintain an action for defamation it must appear that the defamatory words
refer to some ascertained or ascertainable person and that person must be the plaintiff.
Kassowitz v. Sentinel Co., 226 Wis. 468, 277 N. W. 177 (1938); Note (1934) 91 A. L. R.
1161. The civil procedure of a number of states requires that plaintiff allege in his pleading
that the words were spoken of or concerning plaintiff. Saucer v. Giroux, 54 Cal. App.
732, 202 Pac. 887 (1921); Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Pub. Corp., 242 N. Y. 208,
151 N. E. 209 (1926); Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (1911).
5. Wellman v. Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n, 66 Hun 331, 21 N. Y. Supp. 577 (1892). The
article complained of stated plaintiff's alleged recounting to the police of the development
of his suspicions concerning his wife's indiscretions and resultant pregnancy. His wife
was dead. The court held that no cause of action was stated, that the publication solely
affected the deceased and that no libelous statement was made against the plaintiff, despite
the injury to his professional character. The instant case seems justified in following this
square authority. The only possible distinction between the cases is the greater injury to
reputation suffered in the present case.
6. Bradt v. New Nonpareil Co., 108 Iowa 449, 79 N. W. 122 (1899); Benton v. Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 174 Tenn. 661, 130 S. W. (2d) 106 (1939).
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In support of this majority rule it is said that the imputation is directed at the
deceased person alone, 7 and also that, as a matter of law, the reputation of near relatives is not necessarily nor naturally affected. 8 The leading exposition of this view,
contained in Skrocki v. Stahl,9 places reliance upon what is called the American
theory of social relations, "where success or failure is entirely independent of the
accidents of rank or family connection," and states that "theoretically, at least, no
man's character can be aided or retarded by the character of his relatives."10 It is
submitted that this is an instance in which theory and reality are not one.11 A perfectly logical person would riot be influenced against one because of the caliber of
his relatives; but humans are not perfectly logical. Another justification announced
for these cases is a practical one-the difficulty of deciding who shall be placed
within, and who without, the protected circle.' 2 There is much weight in this
objection, for to permit relatives of a defamed person to recover might make a
defamer liable not only to the one defamed, and to his immediate family, but, by
logical extension, to more remote relatives, and perhaps to close friends.' 3
There are two American decisions which have sustained libel actions brought by
7. Wellman v. Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n, 66 Hun 331, 21 N. Y. Supp. 577 (1892);
Benton v. Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 174 Tenn. 661, 130 S. W. (2d) 106 (1939).
8. Sorensen v. Balaban, 11 App. Div. 164, 42 N. Y. Supp. 654 (2d Dep't 1896) (plaintiff's
deceased daughter was referred to as an unmarried girl who had been pregnant and had
suffered a miscarriage). Garrison v. Sun -Printing & Pub. Ass'n, 74 Misc. 622, 134 N. Y.
Supp. 670 (Sup. Ct. 1911); Bradt v. New Nonpareil Co., 108 Iowa 449, 79 N. W. 122
(1899) (article referred to plaintiff's deceased son as a counterfeiter and desperate character).
There are several decisions in which courts intimate that there can be a situation wherein
the reputation of near relatives would be injured and that in such contingency a recovery
for defamation will be allowed. Eagles v. Liberty Weekly, Inc., 137 Misc. 575, 244 N. Y.
Supp. 430 (Sup. Ct. 1930), wherein the court said that maligning the deceased gives no
cause of action to relatives where it does not affect their reputation. See also Renfro Drug
Co. v. Lawson, 144 S. W. (2d) 417, 420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
9. 14 Cal. App. 1, 110 Pac. 957 (1910). Therein the alleged defamatory article stated
"Skrocki (deceased) was an anarchist and brother of Walter Skrocki (plaintiff)."
10. 14 Cal. App. 1, 110 Pac. 957, 959 (1910). (Italics inserted.)
11. In Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594, 596 (1911), the court
stated that where a defamatory statement is published concerning a near relative, it can have
"no tendency to expose a party to ... obloquy, or operate to deprive her of social enjoyment
among right-thinking people!' (Italics inserted.) Ryan v. Hearst Publications, 100 P. (2d)
24 (Wash. 1940). (These cases demonstrate that the rule applies with the same force
when the person primarily defamed is alive, and near relatives sue for the reflection upon
them.)
An answer to these cases is contained in Van Wiginton v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 218 Fed. 795,
796 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914), that "society is to be taken as it is, with its recognized prejudices,
without determining whether they are well founded in reason or justice."
12. Saucer v. Giroux, 54 Cal. App. 732, 202 Pac. 887 (1921); Bradt v. New Nonpareil
Co., 108 Iowa 449, 79 N. W. 122 (1899).
13. Nevertheless, it should not militate against granting relief i a case clearly falling
within the circle, that as we approach its outer rim, we enter a field wherein it becomes
increasingly difficult to determine on which side of the circle the case falls.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

near relatives of defamed deceased persons. One of these cases is Van Wiginton v.
Pulitzer Pub. Co.,1 4 wherein the court stated that "it is commonly recognized that
the disgrace of a criminal is not infrequently visited upon members of his family. .

. ."15

The decision, however, apparently requires that plaintiff be individually

featured in the article and the relationship made prominent. A more liberal holding
v. Post Pub. Co.16 That decision requires merely that the
is contained in Merrill
17
plaintiff be named.
There is another class of cases which in their reasoning appear to be opposed to the
principal case. In cases of libel or slander upon an individual member of a partnership, it seems to be held that the firm may recover for the injury done to its business,
8
The same
provided that the publication reflects upon the standing of the firm.'
rule has been applied to suits by a corporation where its officers have been defamed,
but only if the charge injuriously affects its credit, or the management of its business, and necessarily causes pecuniary loss. 19 In these cases there is a defamation
14. 218 Fed. 795 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914)

(defendant erroneously published an article

stating that plaintiff, a girl of 14, pleaded to save her father, convicted of murdering his

wife, from the gallows. Plaintiff had not so pleaded and her father was not a convicted
murderer).
15.
16.

218 Fed. 795, 797 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914).
197 Mass. 185, 83 N. E. 419 (1908), 21 HAuv. L. REv. 448. Defendant ran a story

about the Merrill family, and erroneously stated that Miss Merrill was arrested and charged
with the theft of mail matter from the post office of which her brother was the postmaster.
The brother sued and recovered. The court does not treat the case as inferring that plaintiff conspired in the theft.
17. To make specifically naming the plaintiff a requisite to recovery seems an unsound
distinction. Reference to a party by name has never been an essential of recovery for
defamation, for it has no necessary relation to injury to reputation. Peterson v. Rasmussen,
47 Cal. App. 694, 191 Pac. 30 (1930); Nunnally v. Tribune Ass'n, 111 App. Div. 485,
97 N. Y. Supp. 908 (1st Dep't 1906), aff'd without opinion 186 N. Y. 533, 78 N. E. 1108
(1906); RESTATENENT, TORTS (1938) § 564.
An interesting case is Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd., [1929] 2 K. B. 331,
(1930) 78 U. or PA. L. REv. 568. Defendant printed a photograph of one Cassidy together
with a woman and stated that their engagement to each other had been announced. In
fact, Cassidy was married, and his wife sues for libel alleging that the article inferred
that she was living in immoral cohabitation, and she recovers. Hough v. London Express
Newspaper, Ltd., [1940] 2 K. B. 107 is a recent reaffirmation of that decision.
18. Beardsley v. Tappan, 2 Fed. Cas. 1183, No. 1188a (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1851); Taylor
v. Church, 1 E. D. Smith 279 (N. Y. 1851), rev'd on other grounds, 8 N. Y. 452 (1853).
See also Melcher v. Beeler, 48 Colo. 233, 110 Pac. 181, 186 (1910); Morgan v. Republic
Pub. Co., 249 Mass. 338, 144 N. E. 221 (1924). See SEELMAN, LAw or LIBEr. AND SrAD
IN THE STATE or NEW YORK (1933)

86-94 on defamation actions by business organizations.

19. Martin County Bank v. Day, 73 Minn. 195, 75 N. W. 1115 (1898) (defamatory
statement was directed at principal stockholder, active in management of corporation.
Court treated it as substantially directed at corporation) ; N. Y. Bureau of Information v.
Ridgway-Thayer Co., 193 N. Y. 666, 87 N. E. 1124 (1908), rev'd on dissenting opinion
below, 119 App. Div. 339, 342, 104 N. Y. Supp. 202, 204 (1st Dep't 1907) ; First Nat. Bank
v. Winters, 225 N. Y. 47, 121 N. E. 459 (1918). See People's U. S. Bank v. Goodwin, 148
Mo. App. 364, 128 S. W. 220, 221 (1910), wherein the court states that special damages
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of a component part of the business organization, and it is allowed recovery as well
as the individual at whom the detraction was directed. 20 This bears some analogy
to an assault directed at one member of a family unit in which case, as we have seen,
recovery is denied the family.2 1 It is not clear from a reading of these business
organization cases whether the publication, though nominally referring to an individual, must be understood by the reader as referring to the business group before
recovery is allowed. 2 2 Although the decisions state that the group may recover for
defamatory words referring to but one of its members, 23 in the decided cases, the
publication did in fact refer to the entire management or it referred to several of the
members of the business organization, the size of which was not revealed.2 4 If these
cases require that the publication must be understood as referring to the group, they
are clearly consistent with general rules.
It is submitted that the instant case is preeminently sound, although in reality the
publication injures the reputation of the plaintiffs, despite the strong dissent expressed
by the minority, and its suggestion that the legislature remedy the decision of the
majority by statute. It is true that a defamatory statement may be published of a
person under such circumstances as to be defamatory also of another not named or
described. The Restatement of the Law of Torts2 5 offers these illustrations: A is a
cuckold; B is an illegitimate child. It then states that A's wife and B's mother have
been defamed.2 6 These cases are nevertheless distinguishable from the instant one.
In them, the remarks clearly impute misconduct and opprobious conduct to the wife
are necessary in this situation. Cf. Brayton v. Cleveland Special Police Co., 63 Ohio St. 83,
57 N. E. 1085 (1900). See also Schreiber v. Gunby, 81 Kan. 459, 106 Pac. 276, 277 (1910),
wherein it was suggested that an officer of a corporation might, in some circumstances,
recover individually for a libel written of the corporation. The attack upon a member of
the firm or corporation must be in reference to his business methods. Adirondack Record,
Inc. v. Lawrence, 202 App. Div. 251, 195 N. Y. Supp. 627 (3d Dep't 1922) (editor of
plaintiff newspaper corporation was referred to as a booze fighter, gambler and immoral
man, held, plaintiff cannot successfully sue for defamation).
20. Collier v. Postum Cereal Co., Ltd., 150 App. Div. 169, 173, 134 N. Y. Supp. 847,
849 (1st Dep't 1912).
21. The situations are, however, distinguishable, for in the business unit, all the members
thereof are allied in carrying out the business enterprise, and it is to this activity that the
defamatory statements are directed. In the family unit, there are many, activities of each
of the members which are not aided or abetted by any other member of the family unit.
22. See Martin County Bank v. Day, 73 Minn. 195, 75 N. W. 1115 (1898).
23. Melcher v. Beeler, 48 Colo. 233, 110 Pac. 181, 186 (1910). See cases cited in
notes 18 and 19 supra.
24. Beardsley v. Tappan, 2 Fed. Cas. 1183, No. 1188a (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1851);
People's U. S. Bank v. Goodwin, 148 Mo. App. 364, 128 S. W. 220 (1910).
25. (1938) § 564 Comment e.
26. The dissent in the principal case relied upon Shelby v. Printing Ass'n, 38 Hun 474
(1886), aff'd on opinion below, 109 N. Y. 611, 15 N. E. 895 (1888), wherein the plaintiff
was held entitled to recover because the defendant stated that she was-an illegitimate child.
In this case, the statement is ciearly understood as referring to the plaintiff. Further,
illegitimacy places one under legal disability as to inheritance, a factor not present in the
principal case. The case would present a stronger analogy had the mother sued and recovered, but, as the text indicates, even that case is distinguishable.
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and mother respectively, and it is to them as well as to A and B that the defamatory
statement is reasonably understood as referring. In the instant case, no improper
conduct can be imputed to the wife and children and it does not seem proper27to say
that it is to them as well that the defamatory statement is intended to refer.
27. It has been suggested that a more difficult case would be presented by the statement
that A is the son of a self-confessed murderer. This view does not seem convincing, for
it is not the form of the words but their substance and the impression conveyed that governs. It is, of course, granted that one's criminal ancestry could be depicted in such a way
that the aspersion would be directed at'such person, and an action for defamation would lie.

CORRECTION
R. Keith Kane, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, is referred to in a footnote
on page 41 of the January issue of the Foanmot LAw REVIEw as one of those participating
in the drafting of the Model State Guard Act, which is discussed by Professor George W.
Bacon in his article entitled "The Model State Guard Act." The Editor and Professor
Bacon wish to correct this slightly inaccurate reference which was quite inadvertently
made. While Mr. Kane did participate in some of the discussions of the drafting committee, and made suggestions from time to time, he did not actually participate in the
drafting, nor did any other representative of the Department of Justice.

